This week the Australian Government's Productivity Commission released its draft report assessing the "efficiency and competitiveness of Australia's superannuation system". Predictably the report found that the system was actually "not so super", and reading through the 571 pages of the full report, Hedge Clippings decided that (purely for expediency as you would understand) the overview, just 65 pages long, was likely to be more our speed.

Taking expediency even further, it was judged that the best way to look at even the draft report was to skip to page 56 under the heading "OVERALL ASSESSMENT". Expediency aside, we would have to say both versions were excellent, and it was almost impossible to fault either the logic, findings or recommendations contained therein.

First and foremost in the recommendations was the removal of "unintended multiple accounts (and the duplicate insurance that goes with them), which the commission estimated would save members collectively about $2.6 billion a year. In addition, if members in underperforming MySuper accounts had instead been moved to the median of the top 10 performing MySuper products, they would collectively have gained an additional $1.3 billion a year".

That's nearly $4 billion a year, probably on behalf of the lowest value accounts, and therefore on behalf of the neediest in the community, which could collectively be added to their retirement benefits. Multiplying that by a 40-year working life makes a mouth-watering $160 billion.

Not surprisingly the Productivity Commission came to the conclusion that "the superannuation system has not kept pace with the needs of members".

What was an outstanding and forward thinking concept introduced by Paul Keating way back in 1983, (allegedly with much input from Garry Weaven, the founding executive chair of industry fund services in the early nineties, and who still wields significant influence in the industry superannuation sector) not only has the system not kept pace with the needs of members, successive governments haven't been able to help themselves and have complicated it disastrously.

Without running through all the findings and recommendations, (again in the interest of expediency), the Productivity Commission's draft report also covered fees (higher than those in other OECD countries), transparency (poor), disclosure (sub-par), performance (mixed, with underperformers particularly prevalent in the retail sector), competition (inadequate),  policy (changes required), default fund selections (unhealthy), erosion of member balances (no comment required), and governance (stronger rules needed).  

We could go on, but that would prevent readers having the enjoyment of thumbing through either report themselves. However, one recommendation, which copped some flak from the industry fund sector, (unreasonably, but given self-interest, not surprisingly), was the call for 30% of each industry fund's board to be made up of independent directors.

The industry funds' position would seem undefendable, apart from the difficulty of finding sufficient appropriately qualified independent candidates. After all, if it is appropriate for the board of an ASX listed company, the majority of which are smaller and have fewer shareholders than industry funds have members, to have 30% independent directors, why not industry super funds?

What's good for the goose, should be good for the gander.