NEWS

14 Nov 2025 - What Really Causes a Market Crash
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What Really Causes a Market Crash Marcus Today October 2025 4-minute read
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What could tip the market over? Well, let me ask you this question - what caused the 1987 crash? Don't know? No, you don't know because there wasn't one specific reason for the 1987 crash. When the dam cracks, you don't go looking at the first drop that came through the first crack and analyse it to find out why it cracked. Because the reason the dam cracked is that, in the year and a half prior to the 1987 crash, the Australian market went up over 100%. What cracked the dam and caused the crash was a build-up of pressure over a long period of time, which eventually broke. Analysing the first drop - why it happened - was irrelevant. We were sitting in Buckmaster & Moore in the UK, and we had one guy on the desk who was a young bloke. He had a client in the US, and doing a few tickets in those days was meaningful because the commissions were about 1.6%, and they went up if the order was larger. Anyway, this young guy started ripping off red tickets - red ticket, red ticket - writing out another one, couldn't write fast enough. He was on the direct line to the dealer at one particular institution - red ticket, another red ticket, another order, another order. By lunchtime, the partners, who sat on the plinth higher than everybody else (such was the hierarchy in those days), took us all out to lunch at the Mithras Bar for pints of Pimm's to celebrate how much business he'd done. We came back from lunch, and he started writing more red tickets - more and more. The hilarity and joy turned to concern. The partners started ringing up people in the industry to check whether these orders were legitimate. They rang the bosses of the dealer at the fund manager, and they said, "Yes, it's okay - keep doing the orders. They're legitimate. He's not a rogue trader." So, the first thing the partners did was start selling their own shares. Then they started ringing their best clients and saying, "This fund manager's selling - you need to start selling, because the market is way up there." And this big institutional fund manager started to sell. Before you knew where you were, everybody was trying to get ahead of everybody else selling. It turned out that these partners had rung other brokers to ask, "Are you, by any chance, getting a particular institution selling a lot of stock?" And they said yes. It turned out that this institution, which was US-based, had sat in its ivory tower in New York and decided it was going to reduce its equity exposures across the world. That meant, in the UK, it had so many billion pounds of stock to sell. It passed the order to the UK office, and the UK office, in order to get it done, had to go to every broker and give them a whole load of orders - and everything cascaded from there. That's what starts a sell-off - a big institution, part of the herd, takes the lead and starts selling. So, what we have to watch out for when the market's up here - and we're not in a bubble at the moment, but we're certainly elevated - is this: For some reason, and it won't necessarily be logical or obvious (and the guy who writes the morning report in the newspaper won't know, but he'll make something up), someone is going to sit in an asset allocation meeting in New York or Singapore or Sydney and decide that their funds management group, which is running hundreds of billions, is going to start exiting Big Tech or exiting equities. And before you know it, you're going to see sell orders coming into the market. The moment the herd - already sensitive to a top - hears that, it'll join in, and the market will cascade. It may not need a catalyst. There may be no headline that day. It'll just start. If it hasn't really got a catalyst, it probably won't last long - it'll probably come back pretty quickly. But it can happen when the market's under pressure, as it is now, with this year's performance and the benefit of the doubt still being given to Big Tech earnings. All the Big Tech stocks are priced for perfection - and many others as well. We're vulnerable to some big fund manager deciding to sell. And everybody will chase them. We're doing 200 miles an hour with our hair on fire. Fund managers aren't stupid - they know one of them will change their mind. Look out for that day. DISCLAIMER: This content is for general information purposes only and does not constitute personal financial advice. Please consider your own circumstances or seek professional advice before making investment decisions. |
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13 Nov 2025 - Performance Report: Airlie Australian Share Fund
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13 Nov 2025 - Performance Report: Quay Global Real Estate Fund (Unhedged)
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13 Nov 2025 - Performance Report: Bennelong Long Short Equity Fund
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13 Nov 2025 - Thirsty servers, hungry investors: how sustainable is AI?
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Thirsty servers, hungry investors: how sustainable is AI? abrdn October 2025 The rapid rise of artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping industries, economies, and investment strategies. But beneath the surface of this technological revolution lies a complex web of environmental and financial risks - particularly around water and energy consumption. For investors, understanding these dynamics is critical to navigating both the opportunities and the vulnerabilities emerging from AI's infrastructure demands and business models. The overlooked thirst of AIWhile the energy intensity of AI has received widespread attention, its water footprint remains underappreciated. Data centres - the backbone of AI - consume vast amounts of water, both directly and indirectly. Direct use stems from cooling systems, particularly evaporative cooling, which loses up to 80% of the water used. Indirect use arises from power generation and Graphics Processing Unit (GPU), or chip, manufacturing - both of which are water-intensive processes. In 2024, data centres directly consumed 95 billion litres of water worldwide. While this is dwarfed by agricultural irrigation, the projected compound annual growth rate of 80% means data centre water use could reach over one trillion litres by 2028 - that's enough to fill 400,000 Olympic-sized swimming pools. Critically many data centres are in regions of medium-to-high water stress, which amplifies localised environmental and operational risks. Water Usage Effectiveness (WUE) is a metric that helps to measure the water efficiency of data centres. It can be particularly useful to compare efficiency across different locations and cooling technologies. Energy-water trade-offs and cooling constraintsCooling technologies present a trade-off between energy and water efficiency. Evaporative cooling is energy-efficient but water-intensive, while air-cooled systems consume more energy but less water. Innovations such as dry coolers, seawater cooling, and reusing waste heat are emerging, but they are highly location-dependent and often come with higher capital expenditure (capex) and operational complexity. Data centres are essentially racks of servers. Server-level cooling is evolving as AI workloads (specifically the GPU chips required) push the energy consumed within these racks (rack-power densities) beyond 100 kilowatts. As the racks consume more power, they create more heat, which means that traditional air cooling becomes insufficient. Liquid cooling - starting with direct-to-chip systems and then immersion cooling for the most advanced GPUs coming to market in the next couple of years - is likely to become essential. However, these systems introduce new risks, including higher capex costs, complex fluid maintenance, possible cooling failures, regulatory scrutiny [1], and execution challenges. The 'fremium' model: monetisation versus infrastructure costsAI's dominant consumer business model is known as 'freemium'. It's a business strategy where a company offers a basic version of a product or service for free, and charges for premium features, usage, or access. It poses a unique financial challenge for companies, though. While platforms like ChatGPT boast hundreds of millions of users, only a fraction are paying customers. This creates a disconnect between user growth and monetised demand. And it raises questions about the sustainability of the massive infrastructure investments that are required for AI, particularly as newer and more expensive cooling technologies will be required to keep advancing AI systems. AI's capex commitments are booming, with new announcements coming every day from the likes of OpenAI, NVIDIA, Oracle, SoftBank and others. Yet, the monetisation of these platforms remains uncertain, prompting some investors to draw comparisons with the dot-com bubble of the early 2000s. A further complication is the emergence of a 'shadow AI economy', where employees opt to use free consumer AI tools they find effective, rather than the enterprise-grade solutions their companies pay for. This behaviour undermines enterprise adoption and revenue growth, potentially slowing the capital spending cycle and making it harder for providers to justify continued infrastructure investment. Capex intensity and financial strainThe scale of AI infrastructure investment is staggering. Bain & Co estimates that meeting global computer demand will require $500 billion annually in capex. Even if firms shift all technology spending to the cloud and cut sales, marketing, and research and development (R&D) budgets by 20%, there is still a shortfall of $800 billion in revenue by 2030 that's needed to underpin AI infrastructure investments. This financial strain is potentially surfacing in accounting practices. Hyperscalers (large, cloud service providers) are extending the assumed useful life of server assets in their financial filings - an approach that can make profitability appear stronger by spreading costs over a longer period. Amazon has recently bucked this trend, in its latest financial statement, it reversed its previous decision to extend server lifespans and instead shortened the depreciation timeline, explicitly citing AI-investments as the reason. The shift potentially signals that AI infrastructure is more capital-intensive than previously assumed, and that earlier lifespan extensions may have understated the true cost. Notably, other hyperscalers followed Amazon's earlier lead in extending server lifespans, raising questions about whether current assumptions accurately reflect the pace of hardware turnover in the AI era. Strategic implications and opportunitiesDespite the risks, AI infrastructure growth presents opportunities for investors in adjacent sectors - not just in large technology companies but also in supply chains. Clean technology firms, energy providers, and component suppliers stand to benefit from rising electricity demand and hardware requirements. However, the competitive landscape is shifting rapidly. Amazon Web Services' decision to develop its own in-house cooling solution for NVIDIA's Blackwell GPUs - rather than relying on traditional external providers - underscores the fast pace of innovation in the sector. This move highlights how major players are increasingly prioritising bespoke infrastructure to optimise performance, which may disrupt established supply chains and challenge conventional providers to adapt quickly. Governments may also play a role, treating AI as strategic infrastructure and offering support that overrides short-term economics. This could create tailwinds for firms aligned with national priorities. Final thoughts...Investors should remain vigilant for signs of stress in the AI ecosystem. AI's transformative potential is undeniable, but its infrastructure demands - particularly around water and energy - require a holistic risk lens. Investors must integrate environmental, technological, and financial indicators into their due diligence process and portfolio construction. The convergence of water stress, energy intensity, and monetisation challenges creates a complex landscape. But with careful analysis and proactive engagement, investors can identify resilient players, and capture long-term value in the AI-driven future. 1. PFAS (per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances), for example. These are also known as 'forever chemicals', which are a group of synthetic chemical compounds that don't break down in the environment. They are known to cause environmental and health issues. |
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Funds operated by this manager: abrdn Sustainable Asian Opportunities Fund , abrdn Emerging Opportunities Fund , abrdn Sustainable International Equities Fund , abrdn Global Corporate Bond Fund (Class A) |

12 Nov 2025 - Performance Report: Bennelong Twenty20 Australian Equities Fund
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12 Nov 2025 - Performance Report: Bennelong Emerging Companies Fund
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12 Nov 2025 - Performance Report: DS Capital Growth Fund
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12 Nov 2025 - Trip Insights: The US

11 Nov 2025 - Research house scrutiny needed
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Research house scrutiny needed Fundmonitors.com November 2025 3-minute read Originally published by SMS Magazine (Self Managed Super) An industry stakeholder has suggested the role of research houses needs to be examined more closely in the wake of high-profile product collapses, such as the Shield Master Fund and First Guardian Master Fund offerings. Research reports and ratings are the first step in the retail distribution chain for fund managers as a report is required for most dealer groups to add a product to their approved product list. "In the case of Shield and First Guardian, it is clear that no rating should have been issued," FundMonitors chief executive Chris Gosselin indicated. "The research process is potentially highly conflicted as the fund manager pays the research house for the report. In reality, the fund manager is not so much paying for a research report, they're paying for the rating." Further, Gosselin noted many in the industry have raised concerns about the current process, which has a lot of fund managers paying up to $35,000 a year per fund for a research report and suggested some could be paying well over $500,000 a year. "A research report should be unbiased, but if the manager is paying the research house, there's the potential for massive conflicts of interest. That's not to say all research is flawed or that conflicts aren't correctly managed in many cases, but Shield and First Guardian highlight the potential issues," he explained. He proposed the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) should be more involved in holding research houses to account for their activities. "A research house should have an AFSL (Australian financial services licence) issued by ASIC, but to date there is a relatively light-touch approach from ASIC to ensure the accuracy and independence of their reports, partly because it is generally only distributed to advisers who are AFSL holders and technically because it doesn't contain advice," he said. In addition, he called for the payment system for research and ratings to be changed. "Rather than the fund manager paying for the research, the platform or end user should pay. A beneficiary-pays approach would remove the conflict inherent in the system," he proposed. |
