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15 Feb 2022 - Performance Report: Cyan C3G Fund
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| Fund Overview | Cyan C3G Fund is based on the investment philosophy which can be defined as a comprehensive, clear and considered process focused on delivering growth. These are identified through stringent filter criteria and a rigorous research process. The Manager uses a proprietary stock filter in order to eliminate a large proportion of investments due to both internal characteristics (such as gearing levels or cash flow) and external characteristics (such as exposure to commodity prices or customer concentration). Typically, the Fund looks for businesses that are one or more of: a) under researched, b) fundamentally undervalued, c) have a catalyst for re-rating. The Manager seeks to achieve this investment outcome by actively managing a portfolio of Australian listed securities. When the opportunity to invest in suitable securities cannot be found, the manager may reduce the level of equities exposure and accumulate a defensive cash position. Whilst it is the company's intention, there is no guarantee that any distributions or returns will be declared, or that if declared, the amount of any returns will remain constant or increase over time. The Fund does not invest in derivatives and does not use debt to leverage the Fund's performance. However, companies in which the Fund invests may be leveraged. |
| Manager Comments | The Cyan C3G Fund has a track record of 7 years and 6 months and has outperformed the ASX Small Ordinaries Total Return Index since inception in August 2014, providing investors with an annualised return of 13.69% compared with the index's return of 8.08% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has experienced a negative annual return on 2 occasions in the 7 years and 6 months since the start of its track record. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -11.61% vs the index's -9.14%, and since inception in August 2014 the fund's largest drawdown was -36.45% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -29.12%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in October 2019 and lasted 1 year and 4 months, reaching its lowest point during March 2020. The Manager has delivered these returns with 0.07% less volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 five times over the past five years and which currently sits at 0.79 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 85% of the time in rising markets and 40% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 67% and a down-capture ratio of 57%. |
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15 Feb 2022 - Performance Report: Bennelong Twenty20 Australian Equities Fund
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| Manager Comments | The Bennelong Twenty20 Australian Equities Fund has a track record of 12 years and 3 months and has outperformed the ASX 200 Total Return Index since inception in November 2009, providing investors with an annualised return of 10.88% compared with the index's return of 7.78% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has experienced a negative annual return on 3 occasions in the 12 years and 3 months since the start of its track record. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -8.84% vs the index's -6.35%, and since inception in November 2009 the fund's largest drawdown was -26.09% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -26.75%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in February 2020 and lasted 9 months, reaching its lowest point during March 2020. The fund had completely recovered its losses by November 2020. The Manager has delivered these returns with 0.53% more volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 five times over the past five years and which currently sits at 0.67 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 96% of the time in rising markets and 7% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 125% and a down-capture ratio of 97%. |
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15 Feb 2022 - Public & private - perfecting the blend - Part 1
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Public & private - perfecting the blend - Part 1 (Adviser & wholesale investors only) CIP Asset Management December 2021 The structure and valuations of fixed income markets have changed dramatically over the past decade or so. Most obviously, interest rates have decreased dramatically and the compensation for taking traditional forms of fixed income risk have declined in tandem. Some of these changes may unwind as we enter a world of higher inflation and withdrawal of central bank stimulus measures over the coming years, but other changes are much more structural in nature. In particular, regulations requiring banks to hold more capital are likely to persist, with an enduring impact being a withdrawal of banks from competing in certain types of lending and reducing their balance sheet commitments to liquidity provision in public credit markets during times of stress. This is creating both challenges and opportunities for asset managers and their investors as alternative sources of credit provision whilst navigating a disrupted liquidity environment and low returns for their traditional liquid bond portfolios. As such, institutional and retail investors have been forced to adjust their approach to fixed income because of these changing dynamics, with the embrace of private debt markets alongside exposure to traditional public credit allocations in an effort to boost returns. Private debt is a complex asset class that can offer a differentiated opportunity set with unique return, risk, liquidity, and diversification benefits. Part 1 of this paper will explore the issues above and, while Part 2 will examine how co-mingling public and private credit in a single portfolio can offer a solution to many of these issues and may offer one of the best opportunities to maximise the potential of each. Distinguishing between public and private debtPrivate credit is often also referred to as "direct lending" or "private lending" or even "alternative credit." Irrespective of the name, they are basically loans to borrowers originated directly by a non-bank asset manager rather than via an intermediary. Unlike traditional bond issues or even syndicated loans (such as US term and leveraged loans), there is little intermediation between borrower and lender. The lender basically arranges the loan to hold it, rather than originating to sell it. As such, the borrower and the lender have a much closer and more transparent relationship, directly negotiating the terms of the finance. In a recent Economist magazine special report on the asset management industry, one of their concluding forecasts was that private debt would become an increasingly important asset class. As the Economist notes,
Private debt is now a significant subset of broader credit markets globally. Underlying exposures include private loans to mid-size or non-listed corporates (often backed by private equity sponsors), commercial, industrial and residential real estate loans that sit outside the risk appetite of the banking sector, as well as loans secured by securitised assets such as mortgages, other loan receivables (particularly from non-bank lenders) or 'alternative' cashflow streams such as royalty streams, insurance premiums or solar panel lease payments. A key distinction-and advantage-across many types of private debt is the ability to customise lending terms thus exercise greater control over credit risk protection compared to public markets. Private credit investors can influence or dictate elements such as coupon and principal payment schedule (amortisation), loan covenants, information access and control rights, tailoring investments to their desired liquidity, return and credit risk profile. In addition, this customisation does not come at the expense of returns. By not introducing an intermediary to arrange the transaction, the fees otherwise paid to the arranger can be shared between borrower and lender, enhancing the overall return profile of the investment relative to syndicated transactions. Australia remains a relatively nascent market compared to offshore growth in private debt assets and corporate credit generally. But this comes with significant advantages due to the lack of competition from asset managers bidding down yields and credit protections to obtain deal flow means that underwriting standards and margins remain strong.
Sources: Private debt investor, Prequin, CIPAM Estimates What is the Illiquidity premium and why does it exist?Any risk premium in investing can be thought of as a transfer of economic rents from risk avoiders to risk takers. In equities, for example, there is a strong, academically established risk premium for investing in small cap companies. This is theorised to exist because these stocks often have less liquidity stemming from their lower overall market capitalisations and lower free float for external shareholders as well as less diversified revenue streams and/or robust balance sheets. In many respects, similar arguments can be made for the existence of a higher rate of return expectation for private debt over public credit.
This means that borrowers who obtain financing from such sources must pay a higher interest rate for a given level of implied credit risk to lenders, who need that higher rate of return to justify their reduced flexibility in managing their investment. Thus, by comparing the rate paid between private debt and public debt at the same assumed credit rating or risk level, one can establish a proxy for the quantum of the illiquidity premium. Term Adjustment based on difference between 5 and 3 year discount margins for Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan index. Rating Adjustment based on difference between the Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan index. Currency Adjustment based on the short term rolling cross currency basis of 10 basis points less the cost of holding 10% in liquids at a cost of 4% for hedging purposes. All figures based on 31 December, 2020. But this does not explain why borrowers choose to, or are forced to, access private debt financing in the first place. The Structural Decline in Bank Risk AppetiteObviously a structural decline in bank lending to non-investment grade corporates, commercial real estate debt, non-public asset backed securities financing (such as warehouse funding facilities (2) for non-bank lenders), long-term project finance and other sub-asset classes of the private debt universe due to tighter regulatory and capital rules has decreased the options available to such borrowers. This increased cost to hold risk has meaningfully altered bank business models. As a result, banks have grown more conservative as they now must consider the risk-adjusted returns of potential loans in the context of more stringent and complex capital requirements - pushing them towards prime home loan origination at the expense of lending to businesses, for example. Changes in bank lending patterns have an important implication for investors. Bank securities-both fixed income and equity-should have different risk-return profiles going forward, as investors in bank-issued bonds and stocks are much less exposed to mid-size corporate lending and many types of real estate financing as well as fixed income trading revenue via the balance-sheet activity of their bank holdings. Source: 1 APRA, 2 Standard eligible mortgage with no mortgage insurance While these regulations have made the global banking system safer and have reduced risk to the financial system, certain risk exposures have become prohibitively expensive for traditional banks as a result of the new rules, creating a funding gap that increasingly is being filled by non-bank market participants. These regulations also have ushered in the rise of 'fintech' lending platforms and financial-disintermediation technologies that provide individuals and small businesses access to new sources of financing. Private credit is often an important source of funding for such new business models, particularly via so called 'warehouse funding' prior to them being able to securitise assets into public markets. But other factors play a role as well. The Growth in Private Equity SponsorshipFirstly, the shift toward private markets has been a consistent macro trend over the past few decades: while private markets have grown substantially during this period, the number of publicly traded companies has declined over the past 20 years. As a result, there are more private companies that require debt financing to fund their growth. Therefore, making private loans to private-equity sponsor backed companies is a big source of private debt origination in Australia and offshore.
Secondly, these borrowers are accessing private debt because they are looking for partners they can rely on to participate alongside them in a journey toward their objectives. They are also looking for some degree of flexibility or tailoring to line up the terms of their debt financing with their business objectives as well as speed and certainty of execution (particularly in a time-pressured acquisition financing scenario). Some or all of these factors are why many borrowers are willing to pay a premium over other lending alternatives. Finally, many borrowers in private credit are too small to access liquid capital markets or don't have the revenue and resources to justify paying for and supporting the due diligence of public credit ratings agencies like Fitch, Moody's and S&P or covering the significant fees of an arranger (plus all the other service providers) who are tasked with structuring and distributing a debt package. Thus, private debt markets are an attractive source of funding for acquisitions, organic growth, and scaling through capital investment outside of raising additional equity. In many ways, the making of a loan is analogous to the manufacturing of a product. In some cases it makes sense to have each stage of the manufacturing process (the due diligence, structuring, documentation and syndication) completed by a different party. But often it is more cost effective for a borrower to work with an individual lender who has internalised the manufacturing of a loan for themselves. What the borrower pays in terms of a higher interest rate is offset by the lower cost of the manufacturing process.
Source: Prequin Pro 2020, Australian Investment Council (AIC) Lastly, an important distinction between public and private markets is that private lending markets are inefficient. In public markets, arrangers effectively run an auction process to establish the lowest yield at which they can sell all of the debt. In private markets, there is generally no auction process. Often a borrower will approach a very small number of lenders (in some cases only one lender, especially where there is a long-standing relationship) and consider the overall package- timeliness, flexibility of terms, execution risk (i.e. does the lender have to syndicate some risk in order to do the full deal), quality and reputation of the lender in addition to the cost of the borrowing. This inefficiency is an opportunity for private lenders, who arguably see more deals and have a better idea of risk and return than the borrower (or the borrower's owner), to identify the best opportunities. Continued in tomorrow's Newsfeed - look for Part 2 Co-authored by: Sam Morris, CFA - Senior Investment Specialist, Fidante Partners & |
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15 Feb 2022 - From a Stroll to a Sprint - Confronting a Faster Tightening Cycle
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From a Stroll to a Sprint - Confronting a Faster Tightening Cycle Ardea Investment Management 31 January 2022 IIn this episode of The Ardea Alternative podcast, Laura Ryan, Tamar Hamlyn and Alex Stanley discuss interest rate rises in response to inflation and what it might mean for fixed income assets. |
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Funds operated by this manager: Ardea Australian Inflation Linked Bond Fund, Ardea Real Outcome Fund |

14 Feb 2022 - Performance Report: Bennelong Emerging Companies Fund
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| Manager Comments | The Bennelong Emerging Companies Fund has a track record of 4 years and 3 months and therefore comparison over all market conditions and against its peers is limited. However, the fund has outperformed the ASX 200 Total Return Index since inception in November 2017, providing investors with an annualised return of 25.13% compared with the index's return of 7.89% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has experienced a negative annual return on 2 occasions in the 4 years and 3 months since the start of its track record. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -10.95% vs the index's -6.35%, and since inception in November 2017 the fund's largest drawdown was -41.74% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -26.75%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in December 2019 and lasted 10 months, reaching its lowest point during March 2020. The Manager has delivered these returns with 15.1% more volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 three times over the past four years and which currently sits at 0.88 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 83% of the time in rising markets and 38% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 298% and a down-capture ratio of 117%. |
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14 Feb 2022 - New Funds on Fundmonitors.com
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New Funds on FundMonitors.com |
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Below are some of the funds we've recently added to our database. Follow the links to view each fund's profile, where you'll have access to their offer documents, monthly reports, historical returns, performance analytics, rankings, research, platform availability, and news & insights. |
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Coolabah Short Term Income PIE Fund |
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14 Feb 2022 - The upcoming earnings season - like drinking from a fire hose
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The upcoming earnings season - like drinking from a fire hose Spatium Capital January 2022 Twice a year, the earnings of various ASX-listed companies are reported. First, in February, providing a snapshot as at the end of December, and then again in August, following the Australian end of financial year on June 30th. Many see this as an opportunity to receive a health check on the current results and future trajectory of these listed companies. Despite the best attempts of forecasters, the unpredictable nature of how the market will respond to a company's earnings leaves many working feverishly to calibrate their respective positions, especially when anomalies are rife. For example, it is not uncommon for a company's stock price to increase when the market expects a greater decline in revenue than what is reported. Conversely, if a company does not achieve expected revenue targets (even if these revenues are positive), then it can result in a decline in the company's ticker price as forecasters adjust their valuations.
The 'bottom-line' may not always paint a clean picture, given 'up-and-coming' businesses often reinvest heavily in market share acquisition strategies (such as marketing, or developing new products). This subsequently drives up 'middle-line' costs with the hope of gaining future 'top-line' benefits. Without itemizing each variable that sits within the top to bottom line segments, we trust the point has been made - earnings season is complex. More so now, it seems, with new environmental, social and governance (ESG) metric expectations. Many businesses are now facing significant shareholder pressure to factor in ESG metrics. Whilst driving up middle line costs now, ESG so far appears to have significant customer and employee retention benefits, as well as being the public 'right thing to do'. The cynic may challenge whether these programs are truly driven by ESG good or future 'top-line' benefit. Whereas the optimist might assert that whilst either motive could be true, greater ESG benefit cannot be a bad thing, irrespective of the method(s) used to get there. This discussion calls into question the purpose of a company (generally speaking, to operate in self-interest) vs. the operation of a government (establishing the rules that do not allow this self-interest to operate unfettered). It is the classic economics example of 'who pays for the light bulbs in streetlamps?' The cynic argues that through the creation of jobs and payment of various taxes, it is the company who pays for streetlamp bulbs. The optimist, true to character, would just be happy they don't have to walk home in the dark. If earnings season wasn't already complex enough, the wider adoption of these new metrics can feel like trying to drink water from a fire hose. Like anything that is new, there will inevitably be kinks that need to be ironed out and parameters that need redefining. Perhaps the nirvana for these new metrics and their wide-scale adoption comes through regular policy and regulation revisions that encourage and guide companies to do what is considered socially better. Or maybe the onus is on the companies to willingly take on these new expectations from the community and thereby lobby the policymakers to formalise these shifts. Is only doing the right thing because you were told to do it enough in our customer-aware world? Either way, we suspect this debate is far from over and we watch with great intrigue how this may continue to impact future earnings seasons. We'd argue that this is only going to become increasingly complex in an environment where pundits and analysts are doing their best to quantify and price-in a rise in interest rates, ongoing supply chain constraints and inflationary pressures that are seemingly going unchecked. Relying on strictly linear forms of measurement or analysis is likely to negate an investing edge and conversely, too much information is likely to saturate one's bandwidth with little clarity on how to use it. We'd argue that the best way to navigate earnings season, or any other disruptive market cycle, is to not only remain convicted to one's tried and tested investment thesis, but also keep half an ear to the ground for emerging trends to consider how these might need to be examined |
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11 Feb 2022 - Hedge Clippings |11 February 2022
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Hedge Clippings | Friday, 11 February 2022 Magellan's, and Hamish Douglass's personal issues have been more than well documented in the media over the past couple of months, so there doesn't seem to be much gained by repeating them. The facts are all well known, thanks mainly to the size and success of the business since being established in 2006, and the high profile given to the individual along the way. However, there are some salient lessons to be learned - not only within Magellan, but also by other fund managers, investors, advisors and the industry as a whole, particularly the research houses, ratings agencies and consultants who have been part of the manager's success over the past 15 or so years. Magellan grew to be (and still is) a significant success story both in Australia and globally. It's easy to criticise, particularly for rival fund managers who might have struggled to attract FUM when so much was flowing into their rival, in spite of Magellan's relative underperformance over the last 5 years. To build FUM of $10bn is no mean feat, getting to around $100bn is extraordinary, and reflects not only performance, but outstanding business management and marketing/distribution along the way. Lesson #1: Key person performance is matched by key person risk. However, FUM of that magnitude requires dedicated management, as does listing and running a public company. Whilst Hamish Douglass's ability is undoubted in both areas, there's only so much one person can do, and how far his focus can stretch. Granted, Magellan had (and still has) a depth of management and a talented team beneath the chairman, but the focus was all Douglass externally leading to many thinking he may be wearing too many hats. Lesson #2: Size matters, but small and nimble has its benefits. Next, size. We have frequently shown that as FUM grows the ability to outperform one's smaller peers can become more difficult. Add in a series of concentrated portfolios - for instance the High Conviction Fund has exposure to just 8-12 stocks, while the larger Global fund has 20-40 stocks, which is still concentrated. A combination of size and concentration limits opportunity, and creates issues when or if the position, or the market turns against you. Size, or FUM, creates other imbalances. The benefit of size is that it opens the door to institutional mandates, not available to smaller managers due to the investors own concentration limits. As seen with Magellan, this can create business risk in the event that a major institution redeems. Lesson #3: Performance is more important than personality. We have often quoted Harold Geneen's "words are words and promises are promises, but only performance is reality". The Magellan Global Fund has returned just short of 14% per annum over the last 5 years which is a solid result, but the fund has underperformed relative to the market and many peers. However, the aura of Hamish, and his ability to hold an audience, is legendary, and the reputation of Magellan itself carried great weight with both investors, advisers, consultants and research houses. There used to be a saying in the early days of IT that "no one ever got fired for buying IBM". In the same way, an allocation to Magellan has been a safe option. The due diligence had been done by the rest of the market, so easier to go with the flow. That allowed the recent relative underperformance to be ignored, or at least not given the level of scrutiny by the gatekeepers and so called experts whose job it was to know and act accordingly. However, for a mere analyst within a ratings house, calling out that underperformance, or for that matter the key person risk involved in a star fund manager and consummate media performer, could be a brave, and possibly career defining act. Unless of course the proverbial has hit the fan and everyone's saying the same thing, and it's daily news in the financial press... Adjusting your research rating AFTER the event is akin to closing the gate after the horse has bolted, but don't get us started on the potential conflicts of interest involved in the fund manager paying for the ratings they receive. Lesson #4: Do your own research, and above all else, diversify. Not everyone has the knowledge or skill to fully analyse a fund's performance numbers, risk factors and KPI's, but there's enough core information available to all users of www.fundmonitors.com (no apologies for the plug) to be able to compare, measure, rank and make good decisions as a result. Forget the names and reputations for moment, do the numbers, and then diversify across strategy, asset class, manager and fund - allowing for the fact that Magellan might well remain part of that diversification. News & Insights Global Strategy Update | Magellan Asset Management With so much going on, where should your focus be? | Insync Fund Managers |
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January 2022 Performance News Bennelong Concentrated Australian Equities Fund L1 Capital Long Short Fund (Monthly Class) |
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11 Feb 2022 - Performance Report: L1 Capital Long Short Fund (Monthly Class)
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| Fund Overview | L1 Capital uses a combination of discretionary and quantitative methods to identify securities with the potential to provide attractive risk-adjusted returns. The discretionary element of the investment process entails regular meetings with company management and other stakeholders as well as frequent reading and analysis of annual reports and other relevant publications and communications. The quantitative element of the investment process makes use of bottom-up research to maintain financial models such as the Discounted Cashflow model (DCF) which is used as a means of assessing the intrinsic value of a given security. Stocks with the best combination of qualitative factors and valuation upside are used as the basis for portfolio construction. The process is iterative and as business trends, industry structure, management quality or valuation changes, stock weights are adjusted accordingly. |
| Manager Comments | The L1 Capital Long Short Fund (Monthly Class) has a track record of 7 years and 5 months and has outperformed the ASX 200 Total Return Index since inception in September 2014, providing investors with an annualised return of 22.78% compared with the index's return of 7.15% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has only experienced a negative annual return once in the 7 years and 5 months since the start of its track record. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -7.21% vs the index's -6.35%, and since inception in September 2014 the fund's largest drawdown was -39.11% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -26.75%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in February 2018 and lasted 2 years and 9 months, reaching its lowest point during March 2020. The fund had completely recovered its losses by November 2020. The Manager has delivered these returns with 6.66% more volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 three times over the past five years and which currently sits at 1.04 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 79% of the time in rising markets and 64% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 94% and a down-capture ratio of 3%. |
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11 Feb 2022 - Performance Report: DS Capital Growth Fund
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| Fund Overview | The investment team looks for industrial businesses that are simple to understand, generally avoiding large caps, pure mining, biotech and start-ups. They also look for: - Access to management; - Businesses with a competitive edge; - Profitable companies with good margins, organic growth prospects, strong market position and a track record of healthy dividend growth; - Sectors with structural advantage and barriers to entry; - 15% p.a. pre-tax compound return on each holding; and - A history of stable and predictable cash flows that DS Capital can understand and value. |
| Manager Comments | The DS Capital Growth Fund has a track record of 9 years and 1 month and has outperformed the ASX 200 Total Return Index since inception in January 2013, providing investors with an annualised return of 15.16% compared with the index's return of 8.91% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has experienced a negative annual return on 2 occasions in the 9 years and 1 month since the start of its track record. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -7.43% vs the index's -6.35%, and since inception in January 2013 the fund's largest drawdown was -22.53% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -26.75%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in February 2020 and lasted 6 months, reaching its lowest point during March 2020. The Manager has delivered these returns with 2.12% less volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 four times over the past five years and which currently sits at 1.18 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 90% of the time in rising markets and 36% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 72% and a down-capture ratio of 51%. |
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