NEWS

14 Apr 2022 - Performance Report: Bennelong Concentrated Australian Equities Fund
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| Manager Comments | The Bennelong Concentrated Australian Equities Fund has a track record of 13 years and 2 months and has outperformed the ASX 200 Total Return Index since inception in February 2009, providing investors with an annualised return of 15.71% compared with the index's return of 10.51% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has experienced a negative annual return on 2 occasions in the 13 years and 2 months since its inception. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -17.98% vs the index's -6.35%, and since inception in February 2009 the fund's largest drawdown was -24.11% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -26.75%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in February 2020 and lasted 6 months, reaching its lowest point during March 2020. The fund had completely recovered its losses by August 2020. The Manager has delivered these returns with 1.69% more volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 four times over the past five years and which currently sits at 0.9 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 90% of the time in rising markets and 20% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 137% and a down-capture ratio of 93%. |
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14 Apr 2022 - Megatrend in Focus: Enterprise Digitisation is accelerating
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Megatrend in Focus: Enterprise Digitisation is accelerating Insync Fund Managers March 2022 Whilst we focused on this exciting megatrend and Accenture last year, things are moving even faster than forecast and so a revisit is timely. Accenture is a prime holding for this megatrend and thus remains in the Insync portfolio. In their recent earnings call, they announced a very strong demand environment. This has induced double-digit growth in all parts of their business and also across all their markets, industries and services. Many of their clients are embarking upon bold transformation programs, often spanning multiple parts of their enterprise in an accelerated time frame. Macro-economics have little impact on these companies spend on digitisation. These clients recognize the need to transform almost all of their businesses, meshing technology, data and AI and with new ways of working and delivering their product or service to market. Current market gyrations have not changed the trajectory of our identified megatrends (including this one) in the Insync portfolio. Our companies such as Accenture continue to grow profitably at multiples many times that of GDP.
Insync's intense focus on the fundamentals, investing in businesses like Accenture that are compounding their earnings at high rates, gives us confidence that the portfolio is well positioned to deliver strong returns as volatility in markets subside. Stocks held by Insync possess:
Funds operated by this manager: Insync Global Capital Aware Fund, Insync Global Quality Equity Fund |

13 Apr 2022 - Performance Report: L1 Capital Long Short Fund (Monthly Class)
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| Manager Comments | The L1 Capital Long Short Fund (Monthly Class) has a track record of 7 years and 7 months and has outperformed the ASX 200 Total Return Index since inception in September 2014, providing investors with an annualised return of 23.56% compared with the index's return of 8.24% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has only experienced a negative annual return once in the 7 years and 7 months since its inception. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -7.21% vs the index's -6.35%, and since inception in September 2014 the fund's largest drawdown was -39.11% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -26.75%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in February 2018 and lasted 2 years and 9 months, reaching its lowest point during March 2020. The fund had completely recovered its losses by November 2020. The Manager has delivered these returns with 6.47% more volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 two times over the past five years and which currently sits at 1.08 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 79% of the time in rising markets and 64% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 93% and a down-capture ratio of 3%. |
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13 Apr 2022 - Performance Report: Cyan C3G Fund
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| Fund Overview | Cyan C3G Fund is based on the investment philosophy which can be defined as a comprehensive, clear and considered process focused on delivering growth. These are identified through stringent filter criteria and a rigorous research process. The Manager uses a proprietary stock filter in order to eliminate a large proportion of investments due to both internal characteristics (such as gearing levels or cash flow) and external characteristics (such as exposure to commodity prices or customer concentration). Typically, the Fund looks for businesses that are one or more of: a) under researched, b) fundamentally undervalued, c) have a catalyst for re-rating. The Manager seeks to achieve this investment outcome by actively managing a portfolio of Australian listed securities. When the opportunity to invest in suitable securities cannot be found, the manager may reduce the level of equities exposure and accumulate a defensive cash position. Whilst it is the company's intention, there is no guarantee that any distributions or returns will be declared, or that if declared, the amount of any returns will remain constant or increase over time. The Fund does not invest in derivatives and does not use debt to leverage the Fund's performance. However, companies in which the Fund invests may be leveraged. |
| Manager Comments | The Cyan C3G Fund has a track record of 7 years and 8 months and has outperformed the ASX Small Ordinaries Total Return Index since inception in August 2014, providing investors with an annualised return of 12.19% compared with the index's return of 8.62% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has only experienced a negative annual return once in the 7 years and 8 months since its inception. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -18.65% vs the index's -9.15%, and since inception in August 2014 the fund's largest drawdown was -36.45% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -29.12%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in October 2019 and lasted 1 year and 4 months, reaching its lowest point during March 2020. The fund had completely recovered its losses by February 2021. The Manager has delivered these returns with 0.18% more volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 five times over the past five years and which currently sits at 0.71 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 86% of the time in rising markets and 39% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 64% and a down-capture ratio of 64%. |
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13 Apr 2022 - Performance Report: Bennelong Kardinia Absolute Return Fund
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| Fund Overview | There is a slight bias to large cap stocks on the long side of the portfolio, although in a rising market the portfolio will tend to hold smaller caps, including resource stocks, more frequently. On the short side, the portfolio is particularly concentrated, with stock selection limited by both liquidity and the difficulty of borrowing stock in smaller cap companies. Short positions are only taken when there is a high conviction view on the specific stock. The Fund uses derivatives in a limited way, mainly selling short dated covered call options to generate additional income. These typically have less than 30 days to expiry, and are usually 5% to 10% out of the money. ASX SPI futures and index put options can be used to hedge the portfolio's overall net position. The Fund's discretionary investment strategy commences with a macro view of the economy and direction to establish the portfolio's desired market exposure. Following this detailed sector and company research is gathered from knowledge of the individual stocks in the Fund's universe, with widespread use of broker research. Company visits, presentations and discussions with management at CEO and CFO level are used wherever possible to assess management quality across a range of criteria. |
| Manager Comments | The Bennelong Kardinia Absolute Return Fund has a track record of 15 years and 11 months and has outperformed the ASX 200 Total Return Index since inception in May 2006, providing investors with an annualised return of 8.07% compared with the index's return of 6.72% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has experienced a negative annual return on 2 occasions in the 15 years and 11 months since its inception. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -7.06% vs the index's -6.35%, and since inception in May 2006 the fund's largest drawdown was -11.71% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -47.19%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in June 2018 and lasted 2 years and 6 months, reaching its lowest point during December 2018. The fund had completely recovered its losses by December 2020. During this period, the index's maximum drawdown was -26.75%. The Manager has delivered these returns with 6.49% less volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 five times over the past five years and which currently sits at 0.68 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 87% of the time in rising markets and 33% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 16% and a down-capture ratio of 52%. |
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13 Apr 2022 - Central banks are going green to questionable avail while stirring risks
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Central banks are going green to questionable avail while stirring risks Magellan Asset Management March 2022
Finland's forests, which cover more than 70% of the country, are the subject of a continent-wide debate on how to halve EU carbon emissions by 2030. Policymakers, environmentalists, companies and the public are arguing over whether the forests should remain untouched, and thus absorb carbon, or be used as biomaterial.[1] Environmentalists want the woodlands in Europe's most-forested country to remain pristine carbon 'sinks'. Finland's government, companies, especially the ones that help forestry products generate 20% of the country's exports, and much of the public want to find commercially viable solutions that alleviate warming risks. That an EU proposal released in mid-2021 favoured the carbon-sink option only intensified the debate. Perhaps the European Central Bank could sort it out? During the dispute over the forests in the euro-member Finland, the ECB declared mitigating climate change was a priority. The central bank said it will embed environmental goals within monetary policy because wild and warmer weather can affect "inflation, output, employment, interest rates, investment and productivity; financial stability; and the transmission of monetary policy".[2] The Bank of England,[3] the Bank of Japan,[4] the Federal Reserve[5] and Sweden's Riksbank[6] are among central banks to mix sustainability and monetary goals to different extents. They are among the 83-member Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System that seeks to "mobilise mainstream finance to support the transition toward a sustainable economy". As part of their green focus, central bankers are calling for net-zero-emissions targets. As they warn of climate systemic risks, central bankers are seeking to use their regulatory powers to enforce climate-risk-based capital standards on banks, conduct climate-change stress tests on financial institutions and force companies to disclose carbon risks. They are under pressure to 'green' the corporate-bond portfolios they have amassed under quantitative-easing programs.[7] To propel the sustainable shift, governments are appointing climate-aware people to central-bank leadership roles. US President Joe Biden this year, to cite a prominent example, nominated former Fed governor Sarah Raskin to be the Fed's vice chair of supervision of the board of governors.[8] In 2020, Raskin slammed the Fed for giving emergency pandemic relief to "dying" fossil-fuel companies.[9] In 2021, she urged financial regulators to exercise their "existing powers" to mitigate climate change.[10] (Such comments appeared to prompt the Senate in March to block her appointment.) Many ask whether it's wise for central banks, which style themselves as above politics, to charge into an issue that governments are struggling to solve because, while the science is not contentious, the politics are. Amid such discussions, two questions stand out. The first is: Will central banks accomplish anything? Those who advocate that central banks consider climate risks say standardising climate-related disclosures and making them mandatory could improve the pricing of climate risks. They say central banks highlighting the long-term financial risks of climate change can only help the public swing behind a solution towards net-zero emissions. They say that central banks can embolden the stability of the financial system over the long term by limiting banking crises caused by a sustained change in weather patterns. Advocates say central banks elevating climate risks would make commercial banks more wary of adding to (and they might even reduce) the US$3.8 trillion major banks have committed to the fossil-fuel industry.[11] Some factors, however, suggest central banks might achieve less than they hope. First, it can be argued that climate change poses little risk to financial stability. Bushfires, droughts, heat waves, rising and warmer oceans, storms and the like have never in modern times triggered a systemic financial crisis.[12] The industries that lose from the shift to a low-carbon economy (so-called stranded assets) are unlikely to imperil the financial system either. It's usually the next big things that bubble to the point of threatening financial stability.[13] A study of financial crises, This time is different by Carmen Reinhard and Kenneth Rogoff, found one common theme behind eight centuries of financial folly; "excessive debt accumulation".[14] The second, perhaps surprising, reason central banks might make little headway for the environment is that banks don't appear to have been threatened by climate change and they seem capable of judging such risks for themselves. A 2021 Fed Bank of New York study of declared US disasters from 1995 to 2018 found US banks have learnt to manage climate risks and they gain from calamities. The study found that banks are adept at avoiding loans for, say, homes in harm's way and benefit from lending for rebuilding, "which actually boosts profits at larger banks". The study noted its findings "are generally consistent" with other studies on bank stability and disasters, even one conducted on banks in the hurricane-prone Caribbean.[15] The results, however, might be different if the world experiences a watershed increase in temperature. Third, central banks elevating the consideration of climate risks is unlikely to be a telling blow to fossil-fuel companies. If commercial banks were to restrict lending to or increase interest-rate charges for fossil-fuel companies, private financial firms are likely to buy these businesses cheaply, especially in the absence of a price on carbon. The Economist estimates that private equity firms have swooped on US$60 billion of dirty assets in the past two years.[16] Fourth, central banks have little legal basis on which to act on green lines.[17] Central banks lack authority to direct bank lending. Parliaments could give central banks these capabilities but it's likely such efforts would be as stillborn as most political efforts to mitigate the climate emergency. In the meantime, central banks can only target net-zero emissions - almost indirectly - by using their regulatory powers to highlight financial-stability risks. Last, there appears to be no link between interest-rate settings and a long-term meteorological event. "When it comes to saving the planet, central banks do not have a magic wand," says Jens Weidmann, former head of the Bundesbank (2011-2021).[18] The other overarching question with central banks going green is: What are the risks? The first is that central-bank climate risk management could clash with their mandates to keep inflation tame over the short and long term. The shift to a net-zero-emissions world stirs what economists call 'greenflation'. This is the term for when fossil-fuel prices jump because investment in climate-harming energy has fallen but demand for dirty power hasn't. Greenflation is already rife in Europe, especially the UK. The second hazard is that central banks might be adopting an explicit role of capital allocation, which breaches their principle of 'market neutrality'. Their climate stress tests, for example, might force banks to pull back from fossil-fuel assets. They are toying with tilting their asset-buying towards sustainable assets - something a Bank of England paper says defies calibration.[19] While central banks control the quantity of money, the allocation of money is a political choice for governments. Smudge the role of central banks and politicians and central-bank credibility and independence could be lost. A theoretical risk is that central banks might encourage a green investment bubble on that could metastasise into a systemic threat - think of it as a central-bank 'green put', even if there is no sign of one emerging. A fourth concern is that central banks might be in danger of 'mission creep', at the cost of their focus on inflation. What, for instance, is stopping central banks pursuing other worthy social goals such as reducing inequality (which is made worse by their quantitative easing)? Setting aside the debate about what central banks might accomplish, the risks show the use of public regulatory powers is a poor substitute for political solutions, even when none are appearing. The problem arising when government institutions step in because politicians can't sort out competing rights is that these bodies become politically tainted. It is best that central banks don't let climate-change priorities get in the way of their traditional tasks, which are hard enough to get right. To be sure, central banks recognise that governments and parliaments have "primary responsibility" to act on climate change.[20] Central banks certainly have a role in managing the short-term costs of combating climate change, especially greenflation. Government policies to mitigate the climate emergency could hurt the economy to the point of creating financial instability. But that's different from saying changed weather and stranded assets could. Central-bank stress testing demands higher capital requirements for credit cards and auto loans than for home loans or the highest-rated companies. It thus could be argued that central banks are already allocating capital and all they seek to do is extend those responsibilities to mitigating the impact of climate risks on the banking system. Plenty of studies, such as one in 2021 from the US's Financial Stability Oversight Council, warn that climate change poses "an emerging and increasing threat" to financial stability.[21] What is more certain is the solutions to achieving net-zero emissions need to come from the political process - where they are being thrashed out for Finland's forests. The conflict of interest UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson this year has faced the threat of a leadership challenge as fellow Conservative MPs (and the public) sickened of endless scandals. These outrages included that Downing Street partied at the height of the pandemic while enforcing strict social restrictions that even prevented relatives being with the dying. They included allegations that Johnson approved the evacuation of zoo animals from Afghanistan while UK nationals were left behind when the Taliban last July took control of the country. The issue, however, commentators said, shaping as the most damaging blow for Johnson is economic. In February, the energy regulator told UK households their electricity and natural-gas bills could soar 54% come April when regulatory price caps are adjusted for prevailing prices. The average household's annual utility bill is forecast to jump by 700 pounds to about 2,000 pounds.[22] Energy prices are surging in the UK because the net-zero-emissions Johnson administration has deterred investment in fossil-fuel energies and renewable-energy companies are struggling to produce enough power to make up for the shortfall in climate-damaging-generated power. (One mishap was that an unusual lack of wind failed to power wind farms while Russia's invasion of Ukraine has only added to energy costs.) The higher power bills come with another blow for UK household budgets. The other battering is higher interest rates. In March, the Bank of England raised its key rate for the third consecutive month. The central bank in March lifted its benchmark rate by 25 basis points to 0.75% because it expects higher energy prices, exacerbated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, to drive annual inflation above 8% within months. The most recent report shows that steeper energy costs boosted UK inflation to 6.2% in the 12 months to February, a 30-year high and more than triple the Bank of England's 2% inflation ceiling. This situation encapsulates the greatest quandary for central banks. Policies such as carbon pricing to reduce the production and usage of fossil fuels are likely to boost inflationary pressures (even if it only shows up directly as a one-off jump in inflation gauges). The greatest contribution central banks might make in the quest to mitigate climate change could be to ensure their economies flourish in a low-inflationary way over the longer term, while ensuring financial stability. That would create the most favourable milieu for the political process to tackle climate change, as messy, protracted and contentious as that method might be. See the debate over Finland's forests. Author: Michael Collins, Investment Specialist |
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Funds operated by this manager: Magellan Global Fund (Hedged), Magellan Global Fund (Open Class Units) ASX:MGOC, Magellan High Conviction Fund, Magellan Infrastructure Fund, Magellan Infrastructure Fund (Unhedged), MFG Core Infrastructure Fund [1] See, 'Finland's forests fire up debate over EU's strategy for going green.' Financial Times. 1 September 2021. ft.com/content/b7e8ae66-f002-4361-84eb-6888ded2ec87 [2] European Central Bank. 'ECB presents action plan to include climate change considerations in its monetary policy strategy.' Media release. 8 July 2021. ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2021/html/ecb.pr210708_1~f104919225.en.html [3] Bank of England. 'Climate change.' bankofengland.co.uk/climate-change [4] Bank of Japan. 'Climate change.' boj.or.jp/en/about/climate/index.htm/ [5] The Federal Reserve. 'Climate change and financial stability.' 19 March 2021. federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/climate-change-and-financial-stability-20210319.htm [6] Sveriges Riksbank. 'Sustainability strategy for the Riksbank.' 16 December 2020. ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/sustainability-strategy-for-the-riksbank.pdf [7] Bank of England 'Climate change' for its climate goals. bankofengland.co.uk/climate-change [8] The White House. 'President Biden nominates Sarah Bloom Raskin to serve as vice chair for supervision of the Federal Reserve and Lisa Cook and Philip Jefferson to serve as governors.' 14 January 2022. .gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/14/president-biden-nominates-sarah-bloom-raskin-to-serve-as-vice-chair-for-supervision-of-the-federal-reserve-and-lisa-cook-and-philip-jefferson-to-serve-as-governors/ [9] Sarah Raskin. 'Why is the Fed spending so much money on a dying industry?' 28 May 2020. nytimes.com/2020/05/28/opinion/fed-fossil-fuels.html [10] Sarah Raskin. 'Changing the climate of financial regulation.' Project Syndicate. 10 September 2021. project-syndicate.org/onpoint/us-financial-regulators-climate-change-by-sarah-bloom-raskin-2021-09 [11] World Economic Forum. 'How central banks are tackling climate change risks.' 4 May 2021. weforum.org/agenda/2021/05/central-banks-tackling-climate-change-risks/ [12] SeeJohn Cochrane. 'The fallacy of climate change risk.' Project Syndicate. 21 July 2021. project-syndicate.org/commentary/climate-financial-risk-fallacy-by-john-h-cochrane-2021-07. See also, 'Could climate change trigger a financial crisis?'. 4 September 2021. The Economist. economist.com/finance-and-economics/2021/09/04/could-climate-change-trigger-a-financial-crisis [13] A problem could arise if climate regulations ensured rapid collapses. But governments would be at fault then, not central bankers. [14] Carmen Reinhard and Kenneth Rogoff. 'This time is different'. Princeton University Press. 2009. See preface. [15] Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 'How bad are weather disasters for banks?' November 2021. Revised January 2022. newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr990 [16] The Economist. 12 February 2022. 'The truth behind dirty assets.' economist.com/leaders/2022/02/12/the-truth-about-dirty-assets [17] Congress, for example, has given the Fed a triple mandate to achieve "maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates. The triple mandate is often referred to as a 'dual mandate' because people ignore the goal of moderate rates. See the Federal Reserve. 'Federal Reserve Act.' 'Section 2A. Monetary policy objectives. federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section2a.htm [18] Jens Weidmann. 'Bundesbank chief: How central banks should address climate change.' Financial Times. 19 November 2020. ft.com/content/ed270eb2-e5f9-4a2a-8987-41df4eb67418 [19] Bank of England. 'Options for greening the Bank of England's Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme.' 21 May 2021. bankofengland.co.uk/paper/2021/options-for-greening-the-bank-of-englands-corporate-bond-purchase-scheme [20] European Central Bank. Op cit. [21] US Department of the Treasury. 'Financial Stability Oversight Council identifies climate change as an emerging and increasing threat to financial stability.' 21 October 2021. home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0 telegraph.co.uk/business/2022/02/13/net-zero-may-become-divisive-brexit/ [22] See Liam Halligan. 'Net zero' may become as divisive as Brexit.' The Telegraph. 13 February 2022. telegraph.co.uk/business/2022/02/13/net-zero-may-become-divisive-brexit/ Important Information: This material has been delivered to you by Magellan Asset Management Limited ABN 31 120 593 946 AFS Licence No. 304 301 ('Magellan') and has been prepared for general information purposes only and must not be construed as investment advice or as an investment recommendation. This material does not take into account your investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs. This material does not constitute an offer or inducement to engage in an investment activity nor does it form part of any offer documentation, offer or invitation to purchase, sell or subscribe for interests in any type of investment product or service. You should read and consider any relevant offer documentation applicable to any investment product or service and consider obtaining professional investment advice tailored to your specific circumstances before making any investment decision. A copy of the relevant PDS relating to a Magellan financial product or service may be obtained by calling +61 2 9235 4888 or by visiting www.magellangroup.com.au. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results and no person guarantees the future performance of any strategy, the amount or timing of any return from it, that asset allocations will be met, that it will be able to be implemented and its investment strategy or that its investment objectives will be achieved. This material may contain 'forward-looking statements'. Actual events or results or the actual performance of a Magellan financial product or service may differ materially from those reflected or contemplated in such forward-looking statements. This material may include data, research and other information from third party sources. Magellan makes no guarantee that such information is accurate, complete or timely and does not provide any warranties regarding results obtained from its use. This information is subject to change at any time and no person has any responsibility to update any of the information provided in this material. Statements contained in this material that are not historical facts are based on current expectations, estimates, projections, opinions and beliefs of Magellan. Such statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, and undue reliance should not be placed thereon. Any trademarks, logos, and service marks contained herein may be the registered and unregistered trademarks of their respective owners. This material and the information contained within it may not be reproduced, or disclosed, in whole or in part, without the prior written consent of Magellan. |

12 Apr 2022 - Performance Report: Bennelong Emerging Companies Fund
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| Manager Comments | The Bennelong Emerging Companies Fund has a track record of 4 years and 5 months and therefore comparison over all market conditions and against its peers is limited. However, the fund has outperformed the ASX 200 Total Return Index since inception in November 2017, providing investors with an annualised return of 25.06% compared with the index's return of 9.75% over the same period. On a calendar year basis, the fund has only experienced a negative annual return once in the 4 years and 5 months since its inception. Over the past 12 months, the fund's largest drawdown was -11.38% vs the index's -6.35%, and since inception in November 2017 the fund's largest drawdown was -41.74% vs the index's maximum drawdown over the same period of -26.75%. The fund's maximum drawdown began in December 2019 and lasted 10 months, reaching its lowest point during March 2020. The fund had completely recovered its losses by October 2020. The Manager has delivered these returns with 14.57% more volatility than the index, contributing to a Sharpe ratio which has fallen below 1 three times over the past four years and which currently sits at 0.89 since inception. The fund has provided positive monthly returns 81% of the time in rising markets and 38% of the time during periods of market decline, contributing to an up-capture ratio since inception of 270% and a down-capture ratio of 117%. |
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12 Apr 2022 - New Funds on Fundmonitors.com
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New Funds on FundMonitors.com |
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Below are some of the funds we've recently added to our database. Follow the links to view each fund's profile, where you'll have access to their offer documents, monthly reports, historical returns, performance analytics, rankings, research, platform availability, and news & insights. |
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12 Apr 2022 - Russia-Ukraine conflict
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Russia-Ukraine conflict 4D Infrastructure March 2022 The politics Putin's reasoning behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine seems principally related to Ukraine's potential desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and Putin seeing this as a threat to Russia. The Western world quickly united (including the traditionally neutral Switzerland) in opposing Russia's actions and introducing a broad array of sanctions. NATO is unlikely to directly assist Ukraine militarily as Ukraine is not a member, and such an intervention would lead to the first ever direct conflict between two nuclear armed super-powers. Hence the importance and extent of the non-military, economic and political sanctions. If the sanctions can effectively target and hurt wealthy Russians, then they may also ultimately influence Putin, or a social movement to oust him. Further afield, China's Xi Jinping will be watching the evolving situation - and importantly, the West's response - closely. Our view is that Xi's biggest concern is domestic social unrest, which could derail his leadership. As such, we don't believe he can achieve this by supporting Russia (discussed further below). However, nor do we believe China will condemn Russia. 4D's exposure to Russia 4D has never had any direct exposure to Russian securities. Our investment process incorporates a country review process, which looks at four key parameters (economic, financial, political and ESG risks) to determine whether we believe a country is an acceptable investment destination. This review is undertaken before we even look at assets within that country. Russia is graded Red (uninvestible) under our process, and has been so since our initial review in 2015, when 4D began. The principal reason for this is Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent annexation. International sanctions were imposed (and remain) on Russia as a result of that aggressive action. While they are nowhere near as extensive as today's, they clearly indicated unacceptable behaviour - hence the Red grading and no core exposure to Russian assets (see Annexure for the short form of our 2021 Russian country review). As a consequence of the more recent sanctions, we reviewed our portfolio for any exposure to Russian assets, no matter how negligible. We placed trading restrictions on any exposed positions until companies had confirmed an exit from Russia or a writedown of assets to zero (where exit was not immediately possible), as we expect all our portfolio positions to support the current democratic stance against the invasion. As a result, negligible exposure has now been written off or the stock is restricted. Global economic implications of the Russian invasion IMF[1] analysis suggests that, in addition to the suffering and humanitarian crisis from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the entire global economy will feel the effects of slower growth and faster inflation. The IMF identified three main channels through which impacts will flow.
The IMF added that, while some effects may not fully come into focus for many years, there are already clear signs that the war and resulting jump in costs for essential commodities such as oil will make it harder for policymakers in some countries to strike the delicate balance between containing inflation and supporting the economic recovery from the ongoing COVID pandemic. China's response There are concerns that China may provide assistance to Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. This could lead to the imposition of sanctions on China, similar to those imposed on Russia. At a virtual meeting on Friday 18 March 2022, US President Biden warned Chinese President Xi of possible 'consequences' for supporting Russia; and Chinese President Xi indicated that 'The Ukraine crisis is not something we want to see'. He added that the events again show that countries should not come to the point of meeting on the battlefield. Conflict and confrontation are not in anyone's interest, and peace and security are what the international community should treasure the most. Why would China assist Russia in Ukraine? Reasons could include global politics and ensuring Russia's future political and potential military support of China. It would also underpin a powerful military alliance balanced against the might of US/NATO in Europe. China may also see business opportunities in Russia given the economic void created by the sanctions. Why wouldn't China support Russia in Ukraine? Put simply, economics, domestic politics and China's self interest. Differing global GDP positions In considering whether China would support Russia in the Ukraine war it is important to acknowledge that China's position in the global economy is vastly different to that of Russia. China is the world's second-largest economy behind the US, with a GDP of US$14.9 trillion in 2020 (~17.8% of global GDP). Russia is only the 11th largest economy in the world, with a GDP of US$1.48 trillion (~1.74% of global GDP). By way of comparison, Australia has a GDP of US$1.35 trillion (~1.7% of global GDP)[2]. With this economic context, there is far less incentive for China to risk its globally dominant economic position to engage in a major conflict at this point in time. China and global trade[3] International trade is the lifeblood of the world economy, but is subject to constant change from economic, political and environmental forces. Emerging economies have seen their share of total global trade rocket in recent years. China's economic interests are different from its security concerns. China is deeply integrated into the global economy. Its share of global trade has increased significantly during the global pandemic, as has its share of global direct investment inflows. China's share in global trade at the end of 2021 was about 17%, and its share in global direct investment inflows at the end of 3Q21 was ~19%. Its total trade flows, which exceeded $US6 trillion last year, dwarf those of Russia. China's firms and leadership are aware that major efforts to support Russia and violate existing sanctions could bring down secondary sanctions on them, especially if such support were to include military assistance. Russia is vulnerable to such sanctions; China would be even more exposed. Below is a table highlighting China's 15 top trading partners in terms of export sales. That is, these countries imported the most Chinese shipments by US$ value during 2020. Also shown is each import country's percentage receipt of total Chinese exports.
Source: China's Top Trading Partners 2020 (worldstopexports.com) Notably: Clearly, any trade sanctions imposed on China by the US or the rest of the world would have a material negative impact on its economy. Chinese domestic politics In summary The domestic political and economic case for China to avoid supporting Russia in the Ukraine war, and risk severe sanctions from the rest of the world, is clear. Unfortunately, rational, humane decision-making has not been a feature of the Ukraine war so far, and we continue to monitor the situation closely. Impact on infrastructure In broader sector terms, we have assessed the immediate and longer-term impact on infrastructure assets in terms of direct and indirect consequences of the current conflict. Energy The conflict has seen an immediate and sharp increase in power prices across Europe as the flow of Russian gas is disrupted and countries scramble to source alternative fuel sources. In the short term this could see coal re-enter the generation mix. Over the medium to longer term we see alternative gas sources being secured, the development/extension of nuclear generation, and further fast-tracking of renewable generation as countries look to balance the social needs of their populous with decarbonisation goals. Those utilities exposed to merchant pricing will be directly and immediately impacted by rising prices, which is a core reason why we don't regard merchant energy as 'infrastructure'.
Transport Immediate impacts of the conflict can be felt in the transport space, due to closure of air space and ports as well as the disruption in commodity sources and supply chains.
As discussed above, inflation will remain high given the contribution of energy in the CPI bucket, which continues to favour transport names (as well as real rate utilities) that have an explicit inflation hedge. However, a significant jump in fuel prices around the globe has a number of flow-on effects to infrastructure names.
Chart 1: Sensitivity of Italian motorway traffic to fuel prices
Source: Mediobanca Chart 2: Sensitivity of Italian motorway traffic to GDP growth Source: Mediobanca
Conclusion The situation in Ukraine is, above all else, a major concern from a humanitarian and global stability standpoint. The positive aspect so far is just how fast the Western world has united in opposing Russia's actions, introducing a large and diverse suite of sanctions designed to punish Russia economically and isolate it internationally. Potentially there are more sanctions to come. While it will be a matter of waiting to see how effective sanctions are in influencing Russia's behaviour, from an investment perspective there are some clear near-term negative impacts (fuel prices, energy costs and inflation uptick), but also some short-term and long-term relative winners in the infrastructure space, including user pay assets (inflation link), rail (increased competitiveness and soft commodity exposure), energy infrastructure (volume support) and utilities building for the future (integrated and pure play regulated utilities). As always, 4D looks to maintain a diversified (regional and sector) portfolio of the best combination of value and quality within the infrastructure sector. At the same time, we look capitalise on long-term infrastructure thematics while remaining cognisant of near-term head and tail winds, including the current conflict and resultant political and economic responses. |
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Funds operated by this manager: 4D Global Infrastructure Fund, 4D Emerging Markets Infrastructure Fund[1] 'War in Ukraine Reverberates Around World', IMF Weekend Read, 19 March 2022 [2] Source - Stastistics.com [3] SMH 16 March 2022: 'As China quietly joins sanctions against Russia, Xi night be too rational to risk arming Putin'. Tianlei Huang and Nicholas R. Lardy are China experts with the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a Washington-based think tank. [4] Cheniere announced on 9 March 2022 that it had agreed to amend the LNG sale and purchase agreement it has with Engie to increase the contracted volumes and extend the term of the agreement. [5] Published in 2021 by BIMCO and International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)
The content contained in this article represents the opinions of the author/s. The author/s may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the article. This commentary in no way constitutes a solicitation of business or investment advice. It is intended solely as an avenue for the author/s to express their personal views on investing and for the entertainment of the reader. This information is issued by Bennelong Funds Management Ltd (ABN 39 111 214 085, AFSL 296806) (BFML) in relation to the 4D Global Infrastructure Fund and 4D Emerging Markets Infrastructure Fund. The Funds are managed by 4D Infrastructure, a Bennelong boutique. This is general information only, and does not constitute financial, tax or legal advice or an offer or solicitation to subscribe for units in any fund of which BFML is the Trustee or Responsible Entity (Bennelong Fund). This information has been prepared without taking account of your objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on the information or deciding whether to acquire or hold a product, you should consider the appropriateness of the information based on your own objectives, financial situation or needs or consult a professional adviser. You should also consider the relevant Information Memorandum (IM) and or Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) which is available on the BFML website, bennelongfunds.com, or by phoning 1800 895 388 (AU) or 0800 442 304 (NZ). Information about the Target Market Determinations (TMDs) for the Bennelong Funds is available on the BFML website. , ... |
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12 Apr 2022 - The Rate Debate - Episode 26
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The Rate Debate - Episode 26 Yarra Capital Management 06 April 2022 How high and how fast can rates go? The RBA expects to see economic data that will drive them to hike interest rates earlier than expected. Markets have already jumped the gun and priced future hikes into bond prices. Is the economy as strong as central banks believe, and will interest rates go up as aggressively as the market suggests? Tune in to hear Darren and Chris discuss this in episode 26 of The Rate Debate. |
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Funds operated by this manager: Yarra Australian Equities Fund, Yarra Emerging Leaders Fund, Yarra Enhanced Income Fund, Yarra Income Plus Fund |





