Finland's forests, which cover more than 70% of the country, are the subject of a continent-wide debate on how to halve EU carbon emissions by 2030. Policymakers, environmentalists, companies and the public are arguing over whether the forests should remain untouched, and thus absorb carbon, or be used as biomaterial.[1]

Environmentalists want the woodlands in Europe's most-forested country to remain pristine carbon 'sinks'. Finland's government, companies, especially the ones that help forestry products generate 20% of the country's exports, and much of the public want to find commercially viable solutions that alleviate warming risks. That an EU proposal released in mid-2021 favoured the carbon-sink option only intensified the debate.

Perhaps the European Central Bank could sort it out? During the dispute over the forests in the euro-member Finland, the ECB declared mitigating climate change was a priority. The central bank said it will embed environmental goals within monetary policy because wild and warmer weather can affect "inflation, output, employment, interest rates, investment and productivity; financial stability; and the transmission of monetary policy".[2]

The Bank of England,[3] the Bank of Japan,[4] the Federal Reserve[5] and Sweden's Riksbank[6] are among central banks to mix sustainability and monetary goals to different extents. They are among the 83-member Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System that seeks to "mobilise mainstream finance to support the transition toward a sustainable economy".

As part of their green focus, central bankers are calling for net-zero-emissions targets. As they warn of climate systemic risks, central bankers are seeking to use their regulatory powers to enforce climate-risk-based capital standards on banks, conduct climate-change stress tests on financial institutions and force companies to disclose carbon risks. They are under pressure to 'green' the corporate-bond portfolios they have amassed under quantitative-easing programs.[7]

To propel the sustainable shift, governments are appointing climate-aware people to central-bank leadership roles. US President Joe Biden this year, to cite a prominent example, nominated former Fed governor Sarah Raskin to be the Fed's vice chair of supervision of the board of governors.[8] In 2020, Raskin slammed the Fed for giving emergency pandemic relief to "dying" fossil-fuel companies.[9] In 2021, she urged financial regulators to exercise their "existing powers" to mitigate climate change.[10] (Such comments appeared to prompt the Senate in March to block her appointment.)

Many ask whether it's wise for central banks, which style themselves as above politics, to charge into an issue that governments are struggling to solve because, while the science is not contentious, the politics are. Amid such discussions, two questions stand out.

The first is: Will central banks accomplish anything? Those who advocate that central banks consider climate risks say standardising climate-related disclosures and making them mandatory could improve the pricing of climate risks. They say central banks highlighting the long-term financial risks of climate change can only help the public swing behind a solution towards net-zero emissions. They say that central banks can embolden the stability of the financial system over the long term by limiting banking crises caused by a sustained change in weather patterns. Advocates say central banks elevating climate risks would make commercial banks more wary of adding to (and they might even reduce) the US$3.8 trillion major banks have committed to the fossil-fuel industry.[11]

Some factors, however, suggest central banks might achieve less than they hope. First, it can be argued that climate change poses little risk to financial stability. Bushfires, droughts, heat waves, rising and warmer oceans, storms and the like have never in modern times triggered a systemic financial crisis.[12] The industries that lose from the shift to a low-carbon economy (so-called stranded assets) are unlikely to imperil the financial system either. It's usually the next big things that bubble to the point of threatening financial stability.[13] A study of financial crises, This time is different by Carmen Reinhard and Kenneth Rogoff, found one common theme behind eight centuries of financial folly; "excessive debt accumulation".[14]

The second, perhaps surprising, reason central banks might make little headway for the environment is that banks don't appear to have been threatened by climate change and they seem capable of judging such risks for themselves. A 2021 Fed Bank of New York study of declared US disasters from 1995 to 2018 found US banks have learnt to manage climate risks and they gain from calamities. The study found that banks are adept at avoiding loans for, say, homes in harm's way and benefit from lending for rebuilding, "which actually boosts profits at larger banks". The study noted its findings "are generally consistent" with other studies on bank stability and disasters, even one conducted on banks in the hurricane-prone Caribbean.[15] The results, however, might be different if the world experiences a watershed increase in temperature.

Third, central banks elevating the consideration of climate risks is unlikely to be a telling blow to fossil-fuel companies. If commercial banks were to restrict lending to or increase interest-rate charges for fossil-fuel companies, private financial firms are likely to buy these businesses cheaply, especially in the absence of a price on carbon. The Economist estimates that private equity firms have swooped on US$60 billion of dirty assets in the past two years.[16]

Fourth, central banks have little legal basis on which to act on green lines.[17] Central banks lack authority to direct bank lending. Parliaments could give central banks these capabilities but it's likely such efforts would be as stillborn as most political efforts to mitigate the climate emergency. In the meantime, central banks can only target net-zero emissions - almost indirectly - by using their regulatory powers to highlight financial-stability risks. Last, there appears to be no link between interest-rate settings and a long-term meteorological event. "When it comes to saving the planet, central banks do not have a magic wand," says Jens Weidmann, former head of the Bundesbank (2011-2021).[18]

The other overarching question with central banks going green is: What are the risks? The first is that central-bank climate risk management could clash with their mandates to keep inflation tame over the short and long term. The shift to a net-zero-emissions world stirs what economists call 'greenflation'. This is the term for when fossil-fuel prices jump because investment in climate-harming energy has fallen but demand for dirty power hasn't. Greenflation is already rife in Europe, especially the UK.

The second hazard is that central banks might be adopting an explicit role of capital allocation, which breaches their principle of 'market neutrality'. Their climate stress tests, for example, might force banks to pull back from fossil-fuel assets. They are toying with tilting their asset-buying towards sustainable assets - something a Bank of England paper says defies calibration.[19] While central banks control the quantity of money, the allocation of money is a political choice for governments. Smudge the role of central banks and politicians and central-bank credibility and independence could be lost.

A theoretical risk is that central banks might encourage a green investment bubble on that could metastasise into a systemic threat - think of it as a central-bank 'green put', even if there is no sign of one emerging. A fourth concern is that central banks might be in danger of 'mission creep', at the cost of their focus on inflation. What, for instance, is stopping central banks pursuing other worthy social goals such as reducing inequality (which is made worse by their quantitative easing)?

Setting aside the debate about what central banks might accomplish, the risks show the use of public regulatory powers is a poor substitute for political solutions, even when none are appearing. The problem arising when government institutions step in because politicians can't sort out competing rights is that these bodies become politically tainted. It is best that central banks don't let climate-change priorities get in the way of their traditional tasks, which are hard enough to get right.

To be sure, central banks recognise that governments and parliaments have "primary responsibility" to act on climate change.[20] Central banks certainly have a role in managing the short-term costs of combating climate change, especially greenflation. Government policies to mitigate the climate emergency could hurt the economy to the point of creating financial instability. But that's different from saying changed weather and stranded assets could. Central-bank stress testing demands higher capital requirements for credit cards and auto loans than for home loans or the highest-rated companies. It thus could be argued that central banks are already allocating capital and all they seek to do is extend those responsibilities to mitigating the impact of climate risks on the banking system. Plenty of studies, such as one in 2021 from the US's Financial Stability Oversight Council, warn that climate change poses "an emerging and increasing threat" to financial stability.[21]

What is more certain is the solutions to achieving net-zero emissions need to come from the political process - where they are being thrashed out for Finland's forests.

The conflict of interest

UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson this year has faced the threat of a leadership challenge as fellow Conservative MPs (and the public) sickened of endless scandals. These outrages included that Downing Street partied at the height of the pandemic while enforcing strict social restrictions that even prevented relatives being with the dying. They included allegations that Johnson approved the evacuation of zoo animals from Afghanistan while UK nationals were left behind when the Taliban last July took control of the country.

The issue, however, commentators said, shaping as the most damaging blow for Johnson is economic. In February, the energy regulator told UK households their electricity and natural-gas bills could soar 54% come April when regulatory price caps are adjusted for prevailing prices. The average household's annual utility bill is forecast to jump by 700 pounds to about 2,000 pounds.[22]

Energy prices are surging in the UK because the net-zero-emissions Johnson administration has deterred investment in fossil-fuel energies and renewable-energy companies are struggling to produce enough power to make up for the shortfall in climate-damaging-generated power. (One mishap was that an unusual lack of wind failed to power wind farms while Russia's invasion of Ukraine has only added to energy costs.)

The higher power bills come with another blow for UK household budgets. The other battering is higher interest rates. In March, the Bank of England raised its key rate for the third consecutive month. The central bank in March lifted its benchmark rate by 25 basis points to 0.75% because it expects higher energy prices, exacerbated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, to drive annual inflation above 8% within months. The most recent report shows that steeper energy costs boosted UK inflation to 6.2% in the 12 months to February, a 30-year high and more than triple the Bank of England's 2% inflation ceiling.

This situation encapsulates the greatest quandary for central banks. Policies such as carbon pricing to reduce the production and usage of fossil fuels are likely to boost inflationary pressures (even if it only shows up directly as a one-off jump in inflation gauges). The greatest contribution central banks might make in the quest to mitigate climate change could be to ensure their economies flourish in a low-inflationary way over the longer term, while ensuring financial stability. That would create the most favourable milieu for the political process to tackle climate change, as messy, protracted and contentious as that method might be. See the debate over Finland's forests.

Author: Michael Collins, Investment Specialist

The politics

Putin's reasoning behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine seems principally related to Ukraine's potential desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and Putin seeing this as a threat to Russia.

The Western world quickly united (including the traditionally neutral Switzerland) in opposing Russia's actions and introducing a broad array of sanctions.

NATO is unlikely to directly assist Ukraine militarily as Ukraine is not a member, and such an intervention would lead to the first ever direct conflict between two nuclear armed super-powers. Hence the importance and extent of the non-military, economic and political sanctions. If the sanctions can effectively target and hurt wealthy Russians, then they may also ultimately influence Putin, or a social movement to oust him.

Further afield, China's Xi Jinping will be watching the evolving situation - and importantly, the West's response - closely. Our view is that Xi's biggest concern is domestic social unrest, which could derail his leadership. As such, we don't believe he can achieve this by supporting Russia (discussed further below). However, nor do we believe China will condemn Russia.

4D's exposure to Russia

4D has never had any direct exposure to Russian securities.

Our investment process incorporates a country review process, which looks at four key parameters (economic, financial, political and ESG risks) to determine whether we believe a country is an acceptable investment destination. This review is undertaken before we even look at assets within that country. 

Russia is graded Red (uninvestible) under our process, and has been so since our initial review in 2015, when 4D began. The principal reason for this is Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014 and its subsequent annexation. International sanctions were imposed (and remain) on Russia as a result of that aggressive action. While they are nowhere near as extensive as today's, they clearly indicated unacceptable behaviour - hence the Red grading and no core exposure to Russian assets (see Annexure for the short form of our 2021 Russian country review).

As a consequence of the more recent sanctions, we reviewed our portfolio for any exposure to Russian assets, no matter how negligible. We placed trading restrictions on any exposed positions until companies had confirmed an exit from Russia or a writedown of assets to zero (where exit was not immediately possible), as we expect all our portfolio positions to support the current democratic stance against the invasion. As a result, negligible exposure has now been written off or the stock is restricted.

Global economic implications of the Russian invasion

IMF[1] analysis suggests that, in addition to the suffering and humanitarian crisis from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the entire global economy will feel the effects of slower growth and faster inflation. The IMF identified three main channels through which impacts will flow.

1. Higher prices for commodities like food and energy will push up inflation further, in turn eroding the value of incomes and weighing on demand.

2. Neighbouring economies in particular will grapple with disrupted trade, supply chains and remittances, as well as an historic surge in refugee flows.

3. Reduced business confidence and higher investor uncertainty will weigh on asset prices, tightening financial conditions and potentially spurring capital outflows.

The IMF added that, while some effects may not fully come into focus for many years, there are already clear signs that the war and resulting jump in costs for essential commodities such as oil will make it harder for policymakers in some countries to strike the delicate balance between containing inflation and supporting the economic recovery from the ongoing COVID pandemic.

China's response

There are concerns that China may provide assistance to Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. This could lead to the imposition of sanctions on China, similar to those imposed on Russia. At a virtual meeting on Friday 18 March 2022, US President Biden warned Chinese President Xi of possible 'consequences' for supporting Russia; and Chinese President Xi indicated that 'The Ukraine crisis is not something we want to see'. He added that the events again show that countries should not come to the point of meeting on the battlefield. Conflict and confrontation are not in anyone's interest, and peace and security are what the international community should treasure the most.

Why would China assist Russia in Ukraine?

Reasons could include global politics and ensuring Russia's future political and potential military support of China. It would also underpin a powerful military alliance balanced against the might of US/NATO in Europe. China may also see business opportunities in Russia given the economic void created by the sanctions.

Why wouldn't China support Russia in Ukraine?

Put simply, economics, domestic politics and China's self interest.

Differing global GDP positions

In considering whether China would support Russia in the Ukraine war it is important to acknowledge that China's position in the global economy is vastly different to that of Russia. China is the world's second-largest economy behind the US, with a GDP of US$14.9 trillion in 2020 (~17.8% of global GDP). Russia is only the 11th largest economy in the world, with a GDP of US$1.48 trillion (~1.74% of global GDP). By way of comparison, Australia has a GDP of US$1.35 trillion (~1.7% of global GDP)[2].

With this economic context, there is far less incentive for China to risk its globally dominant economic position to engage in a major conflict at this point in time.

China and global trade[3]

International trade is the lifeblood of the world economy, but is subject to constant change from economic, political and environmental forces. Emerging economies have seen their share of total global trade rocket in recent years.

China's economic interests are different from its security concerns. China is deeply integrated into the global economy. Its share of global trade has increased significantly during the global pandemic, as has its share of global direct investment inflows. China's share in global trade at the end of 2021 was about 17%, and its share in global direct investment inflows at the end of 3Q21 was ~19%. Its total trade flows, which exceeded $US6 trillion last year, dwarf those of Russia.

China's firms and leadership are aware that major efforts to support Russia and violate existing sanctions could bring down secondary sanctions on them, especially if such support were to include military assistance. Russia is vulnerable to such sanctions; China would be even more exposed.

Below is a table highlighting China's 15 top trading partners in terms of export sales. That is, these countries imported the most Chinese shipments by US$ value during 2020. Also shown is each import country's percentage receipt of total Chinese exports.

Source: China's Top Trading Partners 2020 (worldstopexports.com)

How high and how fast can rates go?

The RBA expects to see economic data that will drive them to hike interest rates earlier than expected. Markets have already jumped the gun and priced future hikes into bond prices.

Is the economy as strong as central banks believe, and will interest rates go up as aggressively as the market suggests?

Tune in to hear Darren and Chris discuss this in episode 26 of The Rate Debate.

Key Takeaways

• Equity markets have yet to indicate that the US economy is at risk of experiencing "demand destruction" in the face of accelerating inflation.

• Consumers appear well positioned to weather this bout of inflation given high levels of household savings and the degree to which the US economy has lowered its energy intensity.

• Should current policy tightening efforts fall short, we believe companies with pricing power and those catering to higher-end consumers may prove most resilient in this environment.

Accelerating inflation has rightly caught the attention of policy makers and investors alike. Expectations that rising prices would cool during the latter half of 2021 proved misplaced as annual US inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index, rose 7.9% in February. The core reading, which strips out volatile food and energy, climbed 6.4%. Both are multi-decade highs. The risk that a rapid rise in prices poses to the US - and global - economy is perhaps best illustrated by how quickly the Federal Reserve (Fed) has pivoted toward overtly hawkish policy, with the US central bank now forecasting the equivalent of seven 25 basis point (bps) rate hikes this year.

The blunt instrument of higher policy rates is not the only factor that gets a vote in the future trajectory of prices. An economic maxim is 'the cure for higher prices is higher prices'. In more conventional parlance, economists refer to this phenomenon as demand destruction, the notion that prices can rise by such a degree that consumer behaviour is altered, thus removing a catalyst for any additional step up in inflation. A contemporaneous Google search will show that demand destruction is top of mind for market participants these days, especially with respect to the jarring rise in energy prices.

An anecdotal gauge for measuring the potential for demand destruction is signals from equity markets. Not only do investors vote with their sell orders on sectors that may be at risk of slowing earnings growth, but also some management teams revise forward guidance based on their expectations for customers' tolerance of higher prices. What are these signals presently telling us about the possibility of pinched consumers cutting back on purchases? They have not reached that point - yet.

While acknowledging that inflation has already entered consumers' psyches, several factors lead us to believe that prices still have some room to run before shoppers' behaviour is altered to the degree that it itself becomes a headwind to growth. Household balance sheets remain strong, and historical precedent indicates that current prices at the pump and other rapidly rising costs can be tolerated - albeit begrudgingly - by consumers. Still, the degree to which prices have risen and the fact that two-thirds of US economic activity is based on consumption means the situation merits monitoring, especially given the glaring inaccuracy of recent inflation forecasts.

Make up your mind

Conventional wisdom was that early 2021 inflationary pressure was due to the low base effects of 2020 lockdowns and would eventually roll off. More recently, the pandemic has also been cited as the cause of inflation due to supply disruptions in key industrial inputs - among them semiconductors and labour. Possibly hoping to be forgotten by policymakers has been the material effects of $4.8 trillion of liquidity that the Fed has injected into the economy since the onset of the pandemic. While extraordinary support was merited during the depth of economic lockdowns, we were concerned that the magnitude of this stimulus would result in the unintended consequence of inflation and that the lagging nature - typically over a year - of these initiatives would mean attempts to rein in accelerating prices would prove a day late and more than a dollar short. All these inflationary ingredients were present even before Russia's incursion into Ukraine sent prices on certain energy and materials products on a near vertical trajectory.

Regardless of the cause, elevated inflation is here, and it is up to equities investors to figure out how to navigate this environment. Coincidentally, data on both the sector and individual company level can provide important clues about how inflation is evolving and how consumers are reacting to these developments.

A likely suspect

Energy prices' contribution to inflation cannot be ignored. They rose 25.6% compared to February 2021 and are a main driver of overall inflationary pressure. How much more consumers can bear elevated energy costs depends upon both their duration and the degree to which they keep climbing. With respect to duration, the absence of Russian products in global markets does not bode well. When reviewing company-level plans for capital expenditure, there are virtually no short-cycle projects that can be quickly brought online to meet existing demand.

Consumers have weathered worse without being compelled to alter consumption patterns. Energy consumption in the US tends to be inelastic, meaning consumers are relatively insensitive to rising prices. Between 2011 and the July 2014, crude as measured by West Texas Intermediate, averaged nearly $100 per barrel. If consumers had felt the need to compensate for higher gasoline prices by scrimping elsewhere, the most likely target would have been discretionary purchases. Yet during this period, the consumer discretionary sector outperformed the broader S&P 500® Index and was the stock market's second-best-performing sector.

Price per barrel of West Texas Intermediate Crude
In the not-too-distant past, consumers and businesses tolerated an extended period of roughly $100 per barrel oil prices …

Source: Bloomberg, as of 25 March 2022.

Cumulative total return by S&P 500 sector: January 2011-June 2014
… yet despite the elevated energy costs during that period, the consumer discretionary sector outperformed broader US equities.

Source: Bloomberg, as of 25 March 2022.

Cumulative total return by S&P 500 sector: year-to-date 2022
Given the 2011-2014 episode and the fairly weak historical link between relative consumer discretionary performance and oil prices, we are cautious to draw the conclusion that this year's discretionary underperformance is directly related to consumers having to prioritise outlays in the face of high energy costs.

Source: Bloomberg

Although the ultimate duration of this period of elevated energy prices remains unknown, prices for crude and refined products are lower than the 2011-2014 period in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Looking forward, there is no magic number as to when demand destruction kicks in. Often mentioned are $150 per barrel of crude and a $5.00 national average at the pump. The reality is, however, that prices are drifting higher and at some point, consumers may be forced to prioritise expenditures.

Exacerbating the situation is that lower-income households will be most acutely affected by sustained higher energy prices as a greater percentage of their monthly outlays are allocated toward energy. A similar dynamic is facing emerging market consumers. In Europe, households and businesses are receiving a secondary gut punch in the form of higher utility costs given their greater reliance upon Russian energy exports. The takeaway for investors is that discretionary sectors that cater to these cohorts may be most exposed to forced changes in consumer behaviour.

In a sign that energy demand remains steady, the margins - or cracks - for refiners between their crude input costs and the revenues derived from end products have thus far held up. Should demand falter, we would expect to see refiner margins narrow.

Rainy day funds

Another factor that leads us to believe that the economy is not yet at risk of seeing a curtailment in consumption is the robust health of household finances. Although consumers' monthly savings rates have recently slid as the most generous period of fiscal stimulus is behind us, the cumulative effects of these extraordinary programs have left consumer balance sheets at historic levels.  As of the fourth quarter 2021, cumulative household savings have reached a record $18 trillion. This cushion has, thus far, enabled households to weather the current bout of inflation.

Household and nonprofits' savings
Since the end of 2019, household and nonprofit institution savings levels have risen by more than $4 trillion, likely creating a shock absorber for higher utility bills and prices at the pump.

Source: Federal Reserve, as of 31 December 2022.

An indicator that peak stimulus has passed is the recent deceleration of retail sales in an array of categories. To compensate for the upheaval caused by pandemic-related shutdowns, we looked at two-year growth rates to gauge which segments have experienced the most deceleration. As of December, this rate for retail sales ex automobiles and gasoline was 18.9%, well below November's 22.6%. There is some noise in these data, as holiday purchases were likely pulled forward to the October/November period, thus meaning the post-holiday figures may have only fallen back to longer-term trends. Furthermore, there are only so many things consumers can buy, and we are not alone in believing that at some point, purchases will shift from the goods that buoyed retail over the past two years toward services such as travel and entertainment. Any potential dip in sales of goods over the next few months may reflect, in part, this transition rather than solely alarmed consumers snapping their wallets shut.

Two-year US retail sales growth rates
Retail sales have thus far proven resilient in the face of rising energy costs, with recent weakness in certain pockets likely the result of purchases being pulled forward during the holiday season rather than consumers feeling pressured to cut back on discretionary purchases.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, as of 31 December 2022.

Still, some retail data points flash signs of caution. Deceleration has been particularly notable in department stores, electronics and appliance stores and non-store retailers. The path does not appear any easier as the hurdle - as measured by two-year comparables - for upcoming months is considerably higher across many retail segments in contrast to those of last autumn.

A canary in the coal mine

To-be-determined is whether the sequential slowdown in these categories is the result of pulled-forward purchases or inflation beginning to bite. Should the latter be what's unfolding, one would expect consumers to first cut back on nonessential purchases. And this is largely how the market is  interpreting it. Year-to-date, through March 24, the consumer discretionary sector has returned -9.8%, well below the -6.0% of the S&P 500 Index. Yet, we believe it is too early to draw firm conclusions that lower prospects for discretionary stocks are directly tied to rising inflation. Other contributing factors are also likely at play. Entering the year, the sector's forward price-earnings (P/E) ratio sat well above its long-term average and was exposed to the risk of multiple compression in the face of rising interest rates (its full-year P/E ratio fell by as much as 24% before slightly rebounding). Also, categories that include goods might see earnings and multiple pressure, although that may be offset, to a degree, by strength in experiences-related sectors. The takeaway for investors is that a cocktail of inflation, rising rates and multiple compression represents a risk to consumer-related stocks - and equities markets more broadly - until the ultimate cadence and ending point of monetary tightening are established.

As previously stated, in the 2011 through mid-2014 period of high oil prices, consumer discretionary was the second-best-performing sector. There have been periods of inflation-induced demand destruction, namely the late 1970s and the years preceding the Global Financial Crisis, but notably, consumers' finances were nowhere near as healthy as they are at present and the US economy was substantially more energy intensive, meaning consumers and businesses were much more vulnerable to an uptick in oil prices.

Based on our conversations with management teams, we have been able to tease out some potential risks and opportunities within the retail sector, should inflation remain elevated. Given the ability of higher-income consumers to absorb elevated food and energy prices, we believe that companies catering to this market segment are better positioned to sustain margins. The same holds true for companies with pricing power, meaning they can pass along higher input costs to customers. We are more circumspect on companies exposed to low-end wage inflation. Physical retailers already face staffing challenges, and absent any meaningful growth in the labour force, we foresee the bidding war for workers to continue. Part and parcel with stimulus checks is the pulling forward of certain purchases. Retailers focusing on durable goods such as appliances, as well as other home-centric categories, may be vulnerable to revenue air pockets caused by this phenomenon. Lastly, higher transportation costs have the potential to exacerbate lingering supply chain disruptions as retailers have come to rely upon higher priced alternatives - such as air freight - to get products to market. Should this trend continue, current estimates for discretionary sector operating margins could prove too optimistic.

Looking forward

Nearly 8% headline inflation has forced the Fed to react. Given the delayed effect of rate hikes - along with still very low levels - the point at which tighter policy begins to constrict growth is likely some ways off. Yet the tempering effects of demand destruction likely remain relatively farther on the horizon as well. An unprecedentedly level of consumer savings will likely enable households to tolerate a relatively extended period of higher prices. The question is how long will this stand. Supply disruptions, wage pressures, fiscal largesse and commodities upheaval have all contributed to the inflationary backdrop. Corralling these forces stands to be tall task and investors should be prepared for how a sustained period of elevated prices will reverberate through equity markets.

Consumer Price Index (CPI) is an unmanaged index representing the rate of inflation of the U.S. consumer prices as determined by the U.S. Department of Labor Statistics.
Basis point (bp) equals 1/100 of a percentage point. 1 bp = 0.01%, 100 bps = 1%.
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil is a specific grade of crude oil and one of the main three benchmarks in oil pricing.
S&P 500^® Index reflects U.S. large-cap equity performance and represents broad U.S. equity market performance.
Price-to-Earnings (P/E) Ratio measures share price compared to earnings per share for a stock or stocks in a portfolio.

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