Approximately nine months ago, we provided a review of our investment case for Nike in 'A Marathon, Not A Sprint'. With the benefit of time, vaccines, additional data points illuminating how consumer behaviour has shifted as a result of the pandemic, and further clarity on Nike's operational performance, it is a good time to take stock and revisit the business again.

The slide below is taken from our investor update presented in October 2020, and summarizes the key points underpinning our initial investment thesis for Nike back in August of 2019.

Source: AIM

While the narrative around Nike for much of the last 18 months has been 'work-from-and-stay-at-home-winner', our view was always that this misses a much more pertinent fact: that the company is undergoing a structural change in its business model that would mean its margin profile would materially increase over the next three to five years. From our October 2020 note:

Prior to our initial investment, we estimated that the sale of a Nike product through its direct-to-consumer (DTC) channel is substantially more profitable than through the traditional wholesale channel. Management have subsequently confirmed this, stating that the sale of an incremental unit through its owned digital channels generate roughly twice the revenue (due to Nike not having to provide a wholesale discount). In the [September 2020] result, management further quantified the margin impact of digital sales: roughly 10% higher gross margins, translating to roughly twice the operating profit of products sold through the wholesale channel.

Sales through Nike's digital channels accounted for ~30% of all revenues in the most recent quarter [ended August 2020]. With management indicating they expect this to increase to between 40% and 50% (and possibly higher) over time, it implies that Nike's historical gross margin profile (in the low-to-mid 40% range) will likely move closer to 50% over the medium term. Nike also plans to modestly expand its own physical retail channel by investing in smaller stores that effectively operate as an extension of the digital channel, allowing for customers to order online and pickup in-store, order in-store for home delivery, or simply function as a small-footprint showroom for consumers wanting to try before they buy.

Combined with increased insight derived from 'owning' the consumer relationship through its own stores and digital channels, we also think there are efficiencies to be gained in general operating and (in particular) marketing expenses over time. All told, we believe it is not inconceivable for Nike to expand operating margins somewhere between 4% to 6% over the next several years due to a combination of mix shift towards DTC channels and revenue growth.

The valuation impact of this margin uplift is material. In theory, by simply shifting the destination where consumers choose to purchase goods from Nike, the business could end up selling the same number of products at the same retail price but end up dramatically increasing profits. By vertically integrating its distribution to be more in-house, Nike is effectively reclaiming margin back from the wholesale channel.

Pulling Ahead of the Pack

Last week, Nike reported quarterly results for the period ended 31 May 2021, where management discussed many of the key drivers of performance for the businesses over the next several years. We were happy to hear that an increased focus on Women's shoes and apparel is bearing fruit, as this was a market Nike has historically underserved. (Turns out there's money to be made in specifically catering to the needs of ~50% of the population!) As this trend matures, we expect it to drive faster organic revenue growth for several years, underpinning market share gains.

Of further interest was the fact that Nike sees the changing positive attitude towards healthier lifestyles coming out of the pandemic as an opportunity to grow the overall market by promoting sports participation, particularly among younger consumers. The combination of greater insight into consumer preferences is driving not only more targeted product development, but also more targeted (and effective) marketing spend.

The interaction of these factors (a structural shift towards healthier lifestyles, expanding into underserved market segments, the shift towards a DTC-business model, and other efficiency gains from investing in technology over the past several years) lead to management issuing the following medium-term (2025) guidance:

• Revenue growth ranging between high-single-digit to low-double-digit, driven by the material opportunities in Women's, apparel, the Jordan brand, digital channels, and international markets. This is several percentage points higher than the average mid-single-digit revenue growth rate of the past few years.
• NIKE DTC will represent approximately 60% of total revenues by FY2025 (from ~40% currently), led by the growth in digital channels.
• NIKE-owned digital will represent approximately 40% of the business by FY2025. Partnered digital channels (large wholesale partners such as Footlocker, JD Sports, etc.) will make up a further 10% of revenues, for an overall digital channel mix of 50%.
• Driven by the mix shift towards Nike's DTC sales channels, gross margins will reach a 'high-40%' number by FY2025 (from a low-to-mid 40% range historically).
• Greater efficiency on operating costs will see the operating margin reach a high-teens percentage by FY2025 (from a 12% to 13% range over the last decade).
• The combination of all the above should lead to earnings per share growth of mid- to high teens out to FY2025.
• Importantly for us, capital expenditures are not guided to materially increase to fund these initiatives, meaning the free cash flow conversion of the above accounting earnings growth should be strong.
• Lastly, this means that returns on invested capital will end up being higher than the previously guided 'low-30%' range, meaning that Nike will continue to create enormous value for its owners.

Of late, the market has been focused on short-term issues, such as port disruptions in the US (meaning inventory was not able to be timeously distributed to consumers for a period), or a consumer boycott of Nike product in China (which seems to be dissipating already). Historically, such short-term 'glitches' are when long-term investors have the opportunity to purchase great businesses with a margin of safety. (Our initial investment in August 2019 was made at the height of the US/China trade war rhetoric; buying a US brand with a meaningful percentage of sales into China was not exactly the flavour of the month.)

By focusing on the longer-term developments that were not yet obvious in the reported numbers - specifically, the change in profitability enabled by the channel mix shift - and understanding the benefits of Nike's 'portfolio' approach to its business (across regions, categories, brands, and sporting codes), the long-term investor would have found much to like. As the margin uplift driven by the DTC shift is now better understood by the market at large, the market valuation has begun to reflect this; in fact, it rallied by nearly 15% on the day following its most recent result as the market capitalised the long-term margin structure into the valuation today. To us, Nike is a case in point where short-term market volatility can benefit the patient investor in buying a quality business at a margin of safety.

While we are sure there are still many unforeseen and unexpected challenges Nike will have to navigate out to 2025, the combination of its strong competitive advantages in brand (and, we believe, in execution), strong cash generation, a conservative balance sheet and a high-quality management team steering the ship gives us comfort that the business is a high-quality compounder, and will be for many years to come.

One of the most useful measurements investors and advisors can use when assessing a manager's past performance is up capture and down capture ratios. These measurements can tell a lot about how a manager has a generated their performance and can indicate whether they are a suitable investment for your portfolios. Up and down capture ratios also are a great indicator of whether a fund is delivering on its philosophy and process.

The up capture ratio shows the percentage of market gains the fund has captured in the months that the market provided positive returns. The higher the up capture ratio the better the manager has done when the market has been doing well. Ultimately, you should expect a long only fund to have an up capture ratio of greater than 100% indicating that the fund performed better than the market in the months the market was positive.

As you would expect the down capture ratio shows the percentage of market losses the fund captured during the months when the market lost money. The lower the down capture the better the fund has performed when markets are down. You would expect a long/short fund to have a down capture ratio significantly lower than 100%, indicating that the fund has protected against the downside.

Isolating up and down capture data provides interesting insights into how active funds have delivered returns over the past 3 and 5 years.

Isolating Global Equity Funds including Long Only and Long/Short Funds over 3 years, to the end of May 2021, the market was positive for 23 months and negative for 13 months:

• The best performer in the peer group had the highest up capture (151%) and the 5^th lowest down capture (57%).
• The 14 funds in the top quintile for performance were all 1^st and 2^nd quintile for up capture and 1^st, 2^nd or 3^rd quintile for down capture.
• As expected, long/short funds had a lower average up capture ratio of 82%. But surprisingly they produced an average down capture of 86%. Of the 17 funds in the long/short peer group, 6 funds had a down capture of greater than 100% and didn't protect on the downside.

Looking at a 5-year time horizon where the market was up for 37 months and down for 23 months:

• The best performer in the peer group had the 2^nd highest up capture (148%) and the 6^th lowest down capture (70%).
• Long only funds proved that they can protect against down markets. The average down capture for long only funds was 87% and only 8 of the 43 funds in the peer group had a down capture greater than 100%.

Having a strong understanding of how a fund performs during different market cycles provides investors and advisors with broader insight into how a fund might fit into a portfolio and provides a unique benchmarking tool to allow them to assess that managers performance.

Detailed information on Up and Down Capture Ratios for over 600 actively managed funds can be accessed via Australian Fund Monitors.

In recent engagements with our investors, the topic that has come up most frequently is fears of higher inflation.

Concerns on inflation are valid. We have essentially had an entire generation of consumers never having had to live through a high-inflation period. Historically, inflation peaked in the early '80s in the US, meaning that a person would have to be in their mid-to-late 40's (at the very least) to even remember it, and more likely in their 60's to have felt the experience of seeing their purchasing power erode at double-digit rates year-over-year. As such, the risk of inflation is top of mind for us as an investment team, and has been since last year.

We think a number of topics around the potential effects of inflation (both near term and long term) on the Fund are worth highlighting, not the least of which is what we as your investment team are doing about it.

Firstly, we distinguish between what could be called 'transitory' inflation (which is affecting near-term sentiment and making news headlines on an almost-daily basis) and potential 'structural' inflation (i.e. where prices go up, and then keep going higher).

If we go back 15 months to when the COVID outbreak began to materially impact economic data, demand for goods and services were artificially depressed, as many consumers were confined to their homes for long periods of time. What we are seeing now is that the reopening of the global economy and the related pent-up demand for goods and services (i.e. the demand-side of the inflation equation) has to an extent overwhelmed the pace at which the supply-side can respond and normalise by producing/delivering a sufficient quantity of goods/services. This demand/supply imbalance has resulted in temporarily higher inflation as there are relatively more people chasing the same (or fewer) amount of goods and services. We expect that as supply chains work through the disconnections (typically it takes several months to ramp up production capacity) and the imbalances normalise, this type of 'demand-pull' inflation will moderate. At present, the combination of 'demand-pull' inflation and a relatively weak comparative base for the period March to July 2020 is pushing up the reported inflation numbers, which is what you are seeing in the headlines on a day-to-day basis.

More of our focus as an investment team is spent on whether or not these temporary inflation trends can become more structural in nature. By way of example, in May, McDonalds in the US announced that they would be increasing the wages of over 36,000 workers by 10% over the next several months. Similarly, Amazon is offering $1000 sign-on bonuses to new employees at starting salaries higher than minimum wage rates (and what would likely have been the going hourly rate otherwise). To us, these are indicators that the labour shortages in the US may manifest in structurally higher wages in time. Given the strong demand levels for goods and services in the near-term, we would expect them to get passed through to the end consumer in higher prices. Essentially, once McDonalds has increased staff wages, we would expect wages to remain at those levels and not to revert lower. The risk here is that this type of wage increase leads to an upwards adjustment in the cost of production/services, leading to cost-push inflation. This dynamic could lead to inflation taking a step-change higher and not be merely 'transitory' in nature (though in time it could be offset by greater automation). As you might suspect, we are watching developments on the wage front closely.

Actions taken in the Fund

Importantly, while the nature of inflation (transitory or structural) and the rate of inflationary increases remain uncertain at present, we have worked to position the Fund to take advantage of this current environment. We have invested in businesses with strong balance sheets and considerable pricing power. By and large, our businesses have utilized the past year to remove costs from their operations without sacrificing the capacity to service their customers. We expect this will translate into sustainably higher margins over the medium term, a point that seems to be ignored by the broader market at present (which seems fixated on the inflation print from now to December 2021). Given the nature of the unique products they sell/services they deliver and their strong market position, our businesses are using the current inflationary environment to not only pass on rising input costs, but in many instances raise prices above inflation. In short, these businesses prefer to operate in the current environment where demand for their goods is strong and they can more easily pass on price increases. We expect this inflationary period to be a tailwind for the businesses in the Fund.

However, business fundamentals are often not reflected in the market (at least, in the short run). Should the inflationary outlook result in central banks globally raising interest rates materially, this will likely negatively impact valuations across all asset classes (equities, bonds & property) as the 'risk-free' rate of return (achieved through owning a government bond or placing money on deposit) will move higher, meaning investors' will reassess how much risk they need to take to generate a specific level of return. Stated more simply, if interest rates are 0% (and inflation remains contained), you'd pay up a lot more for a business that can grow earnings at 15% p.a. for the next five years than if interest rates were 5% and inflation at 4%, (at which point you might well consider having some money on cash deposit). If inflation REALLY takes off, prices might need to come down quite a bit for a period of time. Stocks at the hyper-growth end of the market (think very, very expensive tech names with no demonstrable cash flows) will be disproportionately hurt in such a scenario, which is why we have reduced our overall tech weight since September 2020.

One common theme shared by our businesses is that they are run by management teams who have a demonstrated ability to allocate capital wisely; combined with the fact that they understand how to generate shareholder value (return on capital > cost of capital) the same way we do, they are very sensitive to the acquisition price paid. We believe owning a portfolio of cashed-up businesses with good capital allocators, strong cash flows and little debt is exactly what one would want to do in such a scenario, as it would give CEO's such as Mark Leonard (Constellation), Messrs. Buffet and Munger (Berkshire), the Mendelson family (HEICO), etc. the opportunity to finally deploy their balance sheets in a meaningful way. Seen in this light, we would argue our ability to actively back superior capital allocators places us at an advantage to the major indices (& the ETFs that track them) through such a period, as our businesses have the ability to 'create' value in a shareholder friendly manner (whereas our opinion of the capital allocation skills of the average business in the index is not nearly as benign.)

There is a school of thought that says commodities and commodity producers are a good inflation hedge. This may work for a period of time, but in the long run, doesn't actually hold true. To quote from the 1983 letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders (written just as inflation was subsiding):

Any unleveraged business that requires some net tangible assets to operate (and almost all do) is hurt by inflation. Businesses needing little in the way of tangible assets simply are hurt the least.

And that fact, of course, has been hard for many people to grasp. For years the traditional wisdom - long on tradition, short on wisdom - held that inflation protection was best provided by businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets ("In Goods We Trust"). It doesn't work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates of return - rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for acquisition of new businesses.

In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment - yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, Goodwill [intangibles] is the gift that keeps giving.

The whole piece written by Mr. Buffett on the type of business to own during periods of inflation is worth reading, though it is quite lengthy. (Those readers who are interested can find it here: https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1983.html - simply search for the phrase 'Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities' to skip to the relevant part.)

We are grateful for the interactions we have and feedback we receive from our investors. We view ourselves as a long-term partner rather than simply a fund manager, and would encourage any investor (or prospective investor) to reach out to us with any questions. As an investment team, we are committed to responding personally (and promptly) to these kinds of queries.

While the uncertainties around inflation in the near term persist, we believe the Fund is well positioned to capitalise on a range of outcomes that may unfold in future.

CoreLogic has just reported that national dwelling prices rose by 2.3 per cent in May. That's an annualised rate of more than 28 per cent. And with lenders continuing to provide cheap and easy access to credit, and investors showing lots of interest, I don't see the property market cooling off any time soon.

Here at Montgomery, we've always kept a close eye on the property market. By now you should know we believe access to credit ultimately determines short and medium-term property prices. On that front lending data has been strong for some time and housing credit has accelerated. Unsurprisingly, as we have previously predicted, house prices have risen.

Other factors can have a 'micro-economic' effect on prices through the behaviour of buyers and sellers each weekend, but ultimately the meaningful changes in property prices are driven by credit, and immigration in the longer-term.

The Commonwealth Bank of Australia (ASX:CBA) has just published property lending data, which helps paint a picture of the state of the current property market.

According to the CBA economics team, new housing-related lending rose by 3.7 per cent in April to a new record high (excluding re-financing), while lending to owner-occupiers surged by 4.3 per cent and lending to investors was up by 2.1 per cent. Thank ultra-low rates for that.

Interestingly, lending to first home buyers has fallen for three consecutive months and the CBA believes this reflects declining affordability.

Clearly, the Australian property market is booming and the latest lending data suggests there are ample people looking for property with cheque books approved. That will continue to keep property prices supported.

The CBA notes the lending mix, is shifting. First home buyers are declining while investor buying is strong and lending to owner-occupiers excluding first homebuyers rose by 7.0 per cent.

According to the CBA, housing finance data is a strong leading indicator for dwelling prices.  Mind you, the relationship weakened during COVID when the CBA forecast significant house price declines that never eventuated.

Now prices are rising to record levels, houses are selling faster than ever and the proportion of homes exceeding asking prices is also at a record. It's all thanks to cheap, abundant and easy access to credit. The rate of price increases is quite spectacular. CoreLogic has just reported national dwelling prices rose by 2.3 per cent in May. That's an annualised rate of more than 28 per cent.

Despite the surging property prices, or perhaps because prices are rising so fast, owners are reluctant to sell, resulting in listings remaining stubbornly low. According to CoreLogic again, in the three months to May there were approximately 164,000 dwelling transactions Australia-wide. During the same period however only 136,000 new properties were put up for sale. It seems potential sellers fear missing out on further price rises or being locked out altogether. Consequently, the lack of stock, itself a function of rising prices, is fuelling further price rises.

For what it's worth, the termination of the RBA's Term Funding Facility at the end of June should mean bank borrowing costs for three and four year fixed rate mortgages will rise, and so will rates on those loans. That could dampen demand for loans and if it does could slow the rate of price increases for properties, particularly for owner occupiers.

If investor loans and properties continue to accelerate at the expense of first home buyers, it might be possible some macro-prudential measures by APRA could be implemented. This would serve only to slow the pace of property price rises because interest rates remain ultra-low relative to history and employment, wages and economic data continues to improve. While aggregate wages might not be rising, you only need a bunch of IT or digital recruits to switch jobs for a reported 10-15 per cent wage increase to impact what happens at this weekend's auctions and ultimately impact property prices for everyone else.